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The conventional wisdom is that most trials are won or lost in jury
selection.' If this is true, then in many capital cases, jury selection is
* Visiting Professor of Law, Comell Law School; Director, Comell Death Penalty ProecL BA,
University of North Carolina, 1978; MA.R., Yale University, 1981 J.D., Yale University, 1934.
2 Professor of Law, Comell Law School; Co-Director, Comell Death Penalty Pro!,ect. BA.,
University of Mmnesota, 1975; J.D., Yale University, 1979.
*** Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, S.C. BA., BA., University of Puget Sound, 1933;
NM., University of Chicago, 1939; J.D., Columbia University, 1999.
1. Se4 eg., 45 Am. JUR. Trials § 144 (1992) ("Experienced trial lawyers agrme that a case can
often be won or lost in voir dire."); V. HALE STARR & MAARK MCCO.ZMIC. JURY SELIE"O:N: AN
ATTORNEY'S GUIDETO JURY Lmv AND METHODS § 3.8 (1985) ("Lawyers apparently do win, as thzy
occasionally boast, some of their cases during, or with the help of voir dire.'" (quoting HtAN ZIsEu-,
THE AMEIUCAN JURY, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOC CY V4 THE
UNITED STATES 81-84 (1977))); JON ,L VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTfON PR ED S: Ot.R UNCERri
Co smni'ENr TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 139 (1977) C'Many attorneys believe that trials are
frequently won or lost during Bury selection].'); Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological Cognitive, Personali
and Interpersonal Factors in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL REv. 163, 176(1991) (stating tit a
"case may be [won] or lost at the [ury selection stage]"); Margaret Covington. Jur
, 
Sckczion:
Innorative Approaches to Both Civil and Criminal Litigation, 16 ST. MARY'S U. 575, 575-76 (1934)
(arguing that "[e]xperienced trial lawyers agree that the jury selection process is the singl M'"t
important aspect of the trial proceedings. In fact, once the last person on the jury is ed, the trial is
essentially won or lost."); Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkclried, Jur Selection: An Empirical
Investigation of Demographic Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 285.285 (1995) ("[Juz, "e ction can be-
the most important phase of a trial. Pick the right jury and the battle is half won. But eluct thz w-rong
jury, and the case is lost before [the] evidence is even heard."l; Herald Price Fahringer, "Mirror, Mirror
on the Wall. .. ": Body Language Intuition, and the Art ofJuy Selection, 17 kM. J. TRL%L ADVOC. 197,
197 (1993) (stating that "experts in the field believe that eighty-five perent of the cases litigated are won
or lost when the jury is selected"); David Hitmer & Eric J.R. Nichols, du, Selection in Federal Chil
Litigation: General Procedures, New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 ThY. TECH L REv. 407, 469
(1992) CExperienced trial lawyers view jury selection as a highly tactical. yet alway mysterio zr,
exercise in which cases are often won or lost."); Janeen Kerper, 77e Art and Ethics of Jury Slection,
24 Ai. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 1, 3 (2000) ("[M]any silled trial attorneys maintain that trials can be won or
lost during the jury selection process:); Robert R. Salman & Suzanne A. Saman, Points to Porderfor
Arbitration Agreements, 43 PRAc. LAW. 31, 34 (1997) ("Many trial lawyers believe that ajury trial is
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won or lost at the jury selection phase."); Leslie Snyder, Attorney Conducted Voir Dire in a Criminal
Case, in THE JURY 1984: TECHNIQUES FOR THE TRIAL LAWYER 243, 246 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 274, 1984) ("Voir Dire is one of the most critical phases of the trial: all
can be lost (if not necessarily won) at this point."); Franklin Stricr & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the
Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, IfAnything,
to Do About It, 1999 WIs. L. REv. 441,443 (asserting that the importance of jury consultants is increased
by the widespread belief that a trial is often won or lost during jury selection); Symposium, Panel TAvo:
Inovations for Improving Courtroom Communications and Views From Appellate Courts, 68 IND. L.J,
1061, 1078 (1993) (Honorable James D. Heiple, Justice, Supreme Court of Illinois, remarking that "[t]he
battle in a lot of cases is lost or won before the trial even commences, that is, at the jury selection stage");
Cheryl A. C. Brown, Comment, Challenging the Challenge: Twelve Years After Batson, Courts are Still
Struggling to Fill in the Gaps Left by the Supreme Court, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 379 (1999) ("Many
attorneys believe that a case can be won or lost during the jury selection stage of the trial."); Eric
Wertheim, Note, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 984 (1986) ("[Mlany attorneys believe
trials are frequently won or lost during jury selection.").
Cf Milstein v. Mut. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 705 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. Dist. C1. App. 1998)
(Sorondo, J., specially concurring) ("I begin with the premise that jury selection is the most significant
stage of any trial."); IRVIN OWEN, DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE JURIES: A COMMON SENSE
APPROACH 92, 109 (1973) (stating that "[a] few authors actually rate [voir dire as] the most important
element in trial preparation"); JOHN PROFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS
OF LAW AND FACr § 166 (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1877) ("The examination ofjurors on
the voir dire is looked upon by the practitioner as a very critical period of the procedure, when the
greatest circumspection and discrimination are to be exercised. Accordingly we find the process
lengthened to a tedious and exasperating extent in trials of great importance .... ); Cathy E. Bennet et
al., How to Conduct a Meaningful & Effective Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 46 SMU L REV. 659,
680-81 (1992) (explaining that a good trial attorney puts the same amount of effort in selecting a jury as
is put in presentation at trial "because he or she realizes that he or she can put on the best play in the
world, but without an audience that is receptive to the play, it will be misunderstood and not
comprehended"); Morris Dees, The Death of Voir Dire, 20 LmG. 14, 14 (1993) ("Skillfully conducted
voir dire is the most important element in a fair trial."); William C. Slusser et al., Batson, JE.B., and
Purkett." A Step-by-Step Guide to Making and Challenging Peremptory Challenges in Federal Court, 37
S. TEx. L. REV. 127, 129 (1996) (asserting thatjury selection is the most important part of a trial because
the jury makes the ultimate decision); Harvey Weitz, Voir Dire in Conservative Times, 23 LmO. 15, 15
(1996) ("Voir Dire is the most important, yet least understood portion of ajury trial."); Maureen E. Lane,
Note, Twelve Carefidly Selected Not So Angry Men: Are Jury Consultants Destroying the American
Legal System?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463,467 (1999) ("Because the jurors decide the ultimate fate of
their client, some trial attorneys assert that the jury selection process constitutes the most important phase
of the trial.").
But see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 362-72 (1966) (survey
finding that trial judges, asked to specify aspects of trial performance likely to produce inequality, did not
even mention jury selection practices, indicating that the judges surveyed believed that the differences in
jury selection skills affected trial outcomes far less than other advocacy skills); Dale W. Broeder, Voir
Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL L. REV. 503, 507 (1965) (observing, in a study of
civil and criminal jury trials in a Midwestern federal district court in the late 1950s, that "several of the
lawyers regarded voir dire with disdain, as unlikely to affect materially the result, regardless of what was
said or who was challenged or left on the panel. Judging from the performances turned in, there was
overall a kind of fatalistic attitude, a feeling that one group of twelve was as likely to be as good or as
bad as another."); Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 424 n.119
(1995) (questioning conventional wisdom on the determinativeness of jury selection); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death
Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 & n.4, 282 (2001) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Forecasting]
(concurring broadly with the conception ofjury composition as important in outcome determination, but
noting the crucial role of facts in capital sentencing; "The most egregious cases will tend to produce
death verdicts no matter who sits on the jury; the least egregious will tend to produce life verdicts," The
article continues: "Jury verdicts usually depend more on the facts of the case and less on the personal
characteristics of the jurors."); Michael J. Saks, "Scientific" Jury Selection: Social Scientists Can't Rig
Juries, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 48 (reviewing research and concluding that the quality of
evidence is more important to the outcome of the case than is the composition of the jury); Shari
[Vol. 29:1209
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literally a matter of life or death.2 Given these high stakes and Supreme
Court case law setting out standards for voir dire in capital cases, one
might expect a sophisticated and thoughtful process in which each side
carefully considers which jurors would be best in the particular case.
Instead, it turns out that voir dire in capital cases is woefully ineffective
at the most elementary task--weeding out unqualified jurors.
Empirical evidence reveals that many capital jurors are in fact
unqualified to serve. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the process is far
from even-handed. A juror is not "death-qualified" if she would always
vote against a death sentence, regardless of the circumstances, and a
handful of the jurors who actually serve in capital cases are in fact
unqualified for this reason? On the other hand, a juror is not "life
qualified 4 if she would always vote for a death sentence upon the proof
of capital murder;' if she is a "burden shifter," a person who requires the
defendant to demonstrate why she deserves to live;6 or because she is
Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: Mhat Social Scientists Know and Do Not Knoos, 73
JUDICATuPE 178, 182 (1989) (reviewing research and concluding that the quality of evidence is more
important in determining the outcome than is the composition of the jury); Rodger L Hochman. NoA,
Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of Enrging Caselaw, 17 NOVA L REv. 1367, 1397
n.165 (1993) (noting study results demonstrating that determinativeness of jury seletion may be
overvalued).
2. This is all the more true today in capital cases because, especially in the wake of limitations
placed on federal habeas corpus remedies by the Antiterrorism and Effective Datuh P-nalt) Act of 1936,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,2253-55,2261-66 (1994 & Supp. 2000), appellate and collateral reviw have te-.n-rm
far more reluctant sources of correction for capital-trial error, in particular for claims of ineff,%eiv
assistance of counseL Voir dire must be conducted with the knowledge that "the trial of captal
defendants has become 'virtually the whole ball game."' ABA GuIDEL,'ES FoR THE Amz rt -r AND
PERrzoRmACE OF CouNsEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 1.1 cmn. (19S9) [hereinafter ABA
GumuEL s] (quoting William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent
Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 737, 779 (1984); see also John H.
Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Swrd': Eviscerating tMe Right to
Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the Assistance of Co:msl, 53 MD. L RE%.
1480, 1488-1509 (1999) (analyzing the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' ho1ility to-ard
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).
3. Defense lawyers, prosecutors, and trial judges often refer to these jurors as "'tl7therspin
excludables," or "WEs:' referring to the Supreme Court's holding in 1i,the11e on Illinois. 391 U.S.
510(1968).
4. For the use of this tem, and its correlated term of "'reverse-i7thertpaon' quastion," sze
Morgan i. illinois, 504 U.S. 719,724-25 & n.4 (1992), in v, hich the Court reversed the judgmrent of the
illinois Supreme Court, 568 N.E_.2d 755 (1991). The Illinois court had rejected the daath-sentrt:ed
petitioner's "claim that, pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). veir dire must include the
'life qualifying' or "reverse-qitherspoon" question upon request." Id. at 778. Foran early enamp!e of tl
use of this term, see People v Ranzire- 457 N.E.2d 31,41 (1lL 1983).
5. Defense lawyers, prosecutors and trial judges often refer to these jurors as "automatiz d=eh
penalty" or "ADPjurors:' Early use of the term may ba found at Grigsby r. Mabq, 569 F. Supp. 1273.
1287, 1305-06, 1318 (ED. Ark. 1983), rev'd sub noin. Loekhart v. McCr-. 476 U.S. 162 (1926). See
also Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1310-11 nn.48-49, 1319-20 nn.70-71. 1343.46 rtL1 10-12
& 115,1353 n.133 (Cal. 1980), supersededby statute, CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (W st Supp. 2001).
6. This is the term often used by defense lawyers, prosecutors and trial judg... For an early
example of the concept's appearing in a capital case, albeit with regard to proof regarding the quclion of
guilt or innocence, see People v. Comett, 198 P.2d 877 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor, J.). in %shizh the court
2001]
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"mitigation impaired," a person who is unwilling to consider one or
more mitigating factors that the Supreme Court has said jurors must be
willing to consider.7 In contrast to the small number of "death
unqualified" jurors who actually serve in capital cases, far larger
numbers of jurors who are not "life qualified" serve in capital cases.8
Part II of this article will summarize the law relevant to determining
who is qualified to sit as a juror in a capital case, and then demonstrate
the magnitude of the problem of unqualified jurors as revealed by the
current empirical findings of capital juror studies. Part III then examines
how and why voir dire malfunctions in capital cases, thereby allowing
unqualified jurors to sentence defendants to death. Part IV will suggest
several ways in which courts may help rectify the problem of the
unconstitutional empanelment of jurors who are "uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die."9
II. THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL JUROR QUALIFICATION
A. The Constitutional Constraints on a Capital Juror's Beliefs
1. The Structure of Constitutional Capital Punishment
In every case, a prospective juror must be able and willing to follow
the applicable law in order to be deemed qualified to serve.'0 Put
found that because of faulty instructions by the trial judge, "[t]he jury ... may have believed that after
the prosecution had completed its case the burden shifted upon the defendant to prove that the homicide
was excusable." Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
7. "Mitigation-impaired" is the term often used by defense lawyers, prosecutors and trial judges.
8. See John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in THE MODERN
MACHINERY OF DEATH: CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 8-11 & tbls.l-2 & n.8, on file with the Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, S.C.)
[hereinafter Blume, MODERN MACHINERY]; Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 1, at 279 ("Capital
juries often contain members whose support for the death penalty undermines their impartiality and
renders them legally ineligible to serve. Once seated, these jurors push the final verdict heavily toward
death."). The empirical evidence, therefore, casts doubt on the Supreme Court's postulation that,
"[d]espite the hypothetical existence of the juror who believes literally in the Biblical admonition 'an eye
for an eye,' it is undeniable ... that such jurors will be few indeed as compared with those excluded
because of scruples against capital punishment." Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980) (white, J.)
(citation omitted) (referring to a statute that provided for challenges to jurors who stated that their views
on the death penalty would affect their deliberations on fact issues). Although Justice White's skepticism
about the even-handedness of the Texas law seems well placed, it is not that "eye for an eye" jurors are
scarce, but that the jury selection process, in Texas and elsewhere, seems exceptionally ineffective at
nailing down their actual views and preventing their placement on capital juries.
9. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,521(1968).
10. Theoretically, the Constitution does not require that a juror be willing to impose the death
penalty in order to be qualified to serve on a capital jury. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, all United States death-penalty jurisdictions provide that absolute unwillingness to impose
a death sentence is cause to excuse ajuror in a capital case.
[Vol. 29:1209
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differently, when a juror has beliefs that prevent her from following the
law, she should be disqualified. To recognize when a juror's beliefs
disqualify her from service in a death penalty case, it is therefore
necessary to start with the outlines of capital sentencing law, and then to
compare jurors' beliefs against that standard.
Since the mid-1970s, it has been clear that the touchstone of
constitutional death penalty statutes is individualized decision-making.
After the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in Furman v.
Georgia," it was clear that the arbitrariness and capriciousness
condemned by the Court in Furman would have to be cured or at least
ameliorated in order for any new statutory scheme to pass constitutional
muster. Two approaches were tried. One was mandatory death penalty
statutes; the theory behind these statutes was that they eliminated
arbitrariness by eliminating all discretion. The Supreme Court, however,
struck down statutes that followed this approach. North Carolina's broad
mandatory scheme was deemed impermissible for its "failure to allow
the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death."' " Nor was the breadth of the North Carolina statute
the only stumbling block to constitutionality. Narrower mandatory
statutes were also overturned because the Court reasoned that evolving
standards of decency had rejected the belief that "'every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the
past life and habits of a particular offender.""..
Other states took a different approach to the arbitrariness problem
identified in Furman. These states developed schemes of aggravating
and mitigating factors that were designed to guide discretion. The
Supreme Court approved these "guided discretion" schemes in Gregg r.Georgia,~4 reasoning that the concerns expressed in Furman "can be met
by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance."' Thus, any juror, to follow
the law applicable to a capital case, and thus to be qualified to serve,
must not automaticaly impose the death penalty; she must be able to
consider aggravating and mitigating factors.
Post-Gregg capital sentencing law has elaborated on the
requirements of both the aggravating and the mitigating aspects of
11. 408 U.S. 238(1972) (percuriamn).
12. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion).
13. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,333 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949)).
14. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
15. ld. at 195.
20011
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guided discretion. The requirements related to aggravating factors are
fairly simple; aggravating factors may not be vague, and they must not
penalize constitutionally protected conduct. 6 While the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutorily listed factor that
aggravates a crime beyond simple murder, it may also introduce
evidence of non-statutory factors about the defendant or crime that
makes the death penalty more appropriate, including victim impact
evidence. 7
The law related to mitigation is more complex. Mitigating evidence
neither justifies nor completely excuses an offense, but is evidence that
"in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing
the degree of moral culpability."'" The Supreme Court's mitigation
decisions have increasingly stressed that possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and character is
highly relevant, if not essential, to the sentencing body's constitutional
ability to determine the appropriate sentence. In Lockett v. Ohio,9 the
first of the post-Gregg mitigation cases, a plurality of the Court set forth
the general principle:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. 2
In striking down the Ohio statute at issue in Lockett, the Court held that
the statute's failure to permit consideration of the defendant's age or
relatively minor role in the offense violated the constitutional
requirement of individualized sentencing.2' Subsequently, in Eddings v.
Oklahoma,22 the Court applied the Lockett rule to reverse a death
sentence where the sentencing judge refused to consider evidence of
16. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825,827 (1991).
17. See id. at 827.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "[m]itigating circumstances"). This
language has been reiterated or reflected in statute; see, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-46a(d) (West Supp. 2001). Judicial opinions have noted this definition since the first edition of
Black's. See People v. Leong Fook, 273 P. 779, 781 (Cal. 1928) (in bank) (citing 2d edition); Smith v.
People, 75 P. 914, 916 (Colo. 1904) (citing Black's without reference to edition-thus, presumably,
citing the first edition). Compare with the current edition's definition: "A fact or situation that does not
justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense but that reduces the degree of culpability and thus may reduce
... the punishment [in a criminal case]." BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 236 (7th ed. 1999).
19. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
20. Id at 604 (footnote omitted).
21. See id at 608 ("The limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by
the sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
22. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
[Vol. 29:1209
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"a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe
emotional disturbance."2'
Hitchcock v. Dugger24 further elaborated on the variety of
psychological factors that Lockett covers. Hitchcock's counsel presented
sentencing-phase evidence that, as a child, Hitchcock had habitually
inhaled gasoline fumes, on one occasion he had passed out from doing
so, and thereafter his mind wandered, that he had been one of seven
children in a poor family that had to pick cotton for its living, that his
father had died of cancer, and that Hitchcock had been a loving uncle. z
Because the trial judge instructed the advisory jury to consider only
statutory mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing judge refused to
consider these other, non-statutory mitigating factors, the Court reversed
Hitchcock's sentence. 6 Similarly, in Penry v Lynaugh," the Court held
that the Texas death penalty statute failed to provide the jury "with a
vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response"' to evidence of the
defendant's mental retardation and abused backgroundfr
Thus, as a constitutional matter, a juror must be open to considering
a variety of mitigating evidence. Moreover, Mills v. Marylan&
mandates that each juror must be allowed to determine for herself
whether the defendant has persuaded her of the existence of a mitigating
factor.30 Mills holds that juries may not be instructed to impose a
sentence of death just because the jurors cannot unanimously agree on
the existence of a mitigating circumstance." Therefore, voir dire should
ensure that the venire members seated on the jury are empowered to
react to mitigating evidence in accordance with the dictates of their
conscience, even in the face of adverse reactions from other jurors.
2. Capital Jury Voir Dire Decisions
Thus far we have summarized voir dire implications that flow from
the structure of the capital sentencing decision. The more direct-but
also more limited-source of guidance are the three Supreme Court
decisions that address capital jury selection procedures. Witherspoon v.
23. Id at 115.
24. 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (unanimous decision).
25. See id at 397.
26. See id at 398-99 (holding that sentencer may not refuse to consider, or b- bared from
considering, nonstatutory mitigating evidence).
27. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
28. Id at328.




HeinOnline -- 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1215 2000-2001
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Illinois32 holds that persons who have qualms about the death penalty in
general, and who might be inclined to oppose it as a matter of public
policy, but who can put aside those reservations in a particular case, and
in compliance with their oaths as jurors consider imposing the death
penalty according to the relevant state law, may not be precluded from
serving as capital-case jurors.33 Witherspoon, in short, is a specific
"limitation on the State's power to exclude" persons with qualms about
the death penalty from capital juries.Y Illinois law prior to 1960 provided
that in capital trials, the state could challenge for cause any juror who,
on the basis of "religious or conscientious scruples against capital
punishment[,] might hesitate to return a verdict inflicting [death]."'" The
trial judge in Witherspoon said, near the beginning of voir dire, "'Let's
get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any
time on them.' ' 36 While the Supreme Court declined to conclude that the
exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty produced juries
unconstitutionally predisposed to convict,37 it did hold that, with respect
to sentencing, the sweeping nature of the Illinois exclusion produced not
an impartial jury, but "a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die.
, 38
Notwithstanding the degree to which Witherspoon limits the State's
power to exclude jurors, the Court held in Wainwright v. Witt3' that a
person with absolutist views on the death penalty-relentlessly favoring
it or adamantly opposing it-may be precluded from service, and those
absolutist views need not be proved with "unmistakable clarity" in order
to disqualify her from service as a juror in a capital trial.4" Trial courts
are supposed to assess juror qualification with respect to a standard of
"whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the
32. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
33. See id. at 519-23; see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,731-32 (1992) (characterizing the
holding of Witherspoon).
34. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,48 (1980) (emphasis added). It is important to bear in mind that
Witherspoon does not hold that jurors opposed to the death penalty are unqualified to serve in capital
cases; "Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror." Id. at 47-48. Instead,
Witherspoon restricted states from excusing jurors who, despite their reservations about the death
penalty, are able in an appropriate ease to vote for the death penalty. If it so desired, a state could choose
to let WEs--persons who would never vote to sentence a defendant to death--serve on capital juries. In
contrast, a state could not permit ADP jurors to serve. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29, 735. The rule
against ADP jurors, which will be discussed below, is not, like the Witherspoon rule, a constraint on the
State's power to exclude, but is instead a constitutional limitation on the State's right to allow a juror to
serve.
35. People v. Carpenter, 150 N.E.2d 100, 103 (11. 1958) (emphasis added).
36. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514.
37. See id. at 516-18.
38. Id. at521.
39. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
40. See id. at 424.
[Vol. 29:1209
HeinOnline -- 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1216 2000-2001
PROBING "LIFE QUALIFICATION"
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath."4' Appellate courts, in most cases, must extend deference to
the trial judge's exercise of discretion in determining whether, in the
course of voir dire, she "is left with the definite impression that a
prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the
law."42 Such jurors are often referred to as "Witherspoon-excludables."o
In the third decision, Morgan v. Illinois," the Court reiterated that
jurors who would "be unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death
penalty in every case ... by definition are ones who cannot perform
their duties in accordance with law."" In particular, "juror[s] who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case" must be
disqualified from service, because their presence on the jury would
violate "the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '' The right to an impartial jury,
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, cannot be secured
without "an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.""7
"[G]eneral fairness and 'follow the law' questions" do not constitute
adequate voir dire because:
[A] juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet
be unaware that [underlying] dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty
would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his
life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective
jurors function under such misconception.43
Importantly, Morgan also indicates that a broad range of
mitigation-impaired jurors are constitutionally unqualified. As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his dissent:
[I]t is impossible in principle to distinguish between a juror who does
not believe that any factor can be mitigating from one who believes
that a particular factor-e.g., "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance[]"-is not mitigating (presumably, under today's decision
a juror who thinks a "bad childhood" is never mitigating must also be
excluded))4
41. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id at 426.
43. The Supreme Court also uses this term. See Lockhart v. McCrei, 476 US. 162 10 (1926)
see also Morgan v. llinois, 504 U.S. 719,733 (1992).
44. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
45. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735; see also Lockzat, 476 U.S. at 176.
46. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729.
47. Id
48. Id at 734-36 (footnote omitted).
49. Id at 744 n.3 (Scalia, ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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In other words, the class of mitigation-impaired-and constitutionally
unqualified-jurors includes not only those who are unable or unwilling
to ever consider any form of mitigation, but also those who are either
unable or unwilling ever to consider a particular mitigating factor." We
50. "Moreover, Edings makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present
mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that
evidence in imposing sentence." Pemy v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,319 (1989) (emphasis added).
Although it is not within the scope of this article, we note that, even if all the constitutional
qualifications reviewed above were scrupulously implemented, and all unqualified jurors were actually
kept from serving on capital juries, the exclusion of the class of persons adamantly opposed to the death
penalty in all circumstances would still result in capital juries being composed of persons more inclined
to convict in the guilt-or-innocence phase than juries that are not death-qualified. See Grigsby v. Mabry,
569 F. Supp. 1273, 1291-1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (assessing studies showing that going through death
qualification increases willingness of individual jurors to convict and condemn, as well as resulting in
juries that are more disposed to reach those outcomes), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986); Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-55 (Cal. 1980) (discussing studies that
demonstrate the conviction proneness of death-qualified juries), superseded by statute, CAL, CIv. PROC.
CODE § 223 (West Supp. 2001); Jonathan L Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC.
CHANGE 59, 141 n.593 (1996) (reviewing judicial decisions, scholarship, and studies confirming that
death-qualified juries are conviction-prone); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification
on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHtAV. 53, 55-
75 (1984) (examining studies that almost universally conclude that death qualification produces juries
more predisposed to convict than non-death-qualified juries); Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 1,
at 283-84 & n.32, 307-08; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE
THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 42, 58 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). Even
though the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that death-qualification impairs a defendant's
constitutional right to an impartial jury, see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-84 (1986), the
empirical evidence establishes that death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone than other juries,
because of either the types of jurors the process selects and excludes, or the effect of the process on
jurors' views and perceptions, or both. See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 11.7.2 cmt.
(observing that the winnowing of WEs from the venire "effectively skews the jury pool not only as to
imposition of the death penalty but as to conviction"); Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys, Life
Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death Qualification, 20 LAW & HUm. BEHAV, 147,
156-64 (1996); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Construing Motive in Videotaped Killings: The Role of
Jurors'Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 257,269 (1998) (discussing study
results suggesting death-qualified jurors are more conviction-prone than non-death-qualified jurors);
Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process,
8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 128 (1984) [hereinafter Haney, Selection of Capital Juries] ("Exposure to
death qualification increase[s jurors'] belief in the guilt of the defendant and their estimate that he [will]
be convicted."); James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263,275 (1988)
(discussing study revealing that individuals strongly opposed to the death penalty are more likely to find
mitigating circumstances); William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction
Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 111 (1984)
(concluding from experimental empirical study that death-qualified jurors tend to favor the State in
interpreting testimony and require less evidence to convince them of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
therefore making them more conviction-prone than jurors in general); see also Craig Haney et al.,
"Modem" Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 619, 631
(1994) [hereinafter Haney et al., Death-Qualification] (concluding that death-qualification "continues to
produce a group of eligible jurors in capital cases-under whatever standard they are defined-that
appear to be significantly different on a number of important dimensions from jurors eligible to sit in any
other kind of criminal case"). Studies also indicate that death-qualified jurors are more strongly
influenced by aggravating factors than are jurors in general. See, e.g., Goodman-Delahunty et al., stpra,
at 269 (concluding from mock jury study that death-qualified jurors will more likely "infer... (1) that
the defendant intended to murder the victim, (2) that his specific actions indicated premeditation, (3) that
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want to be careful not to overstate this holding: Morgan does not mean
that jurors are required to assign any particular weight to mitigation in
any particular case, or to any particular form of mitigation, but only that
they must be willing and able to give meaningful consideration to
mitigating evidence.'
Thus, taken together, these constitutional constraints mean that in
order to be qualified to serve in a capital case, a prospective juror must
be willing and able to: (1) require the State to prove all of the elements
of murder and an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (2)
make an individualized decision in cases where both murder and an
aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as
to whether death is the right punishment in that case, neither rejecting
nor imposing it in every case; (3) give meaningful consideration to a
wide range of mitigating factors; and (4) listen to and consider the
thoughts of fellow jurors but stand her ground if convinced of a
conclusion contrary to that of other jurors.
B. The Empirical Realities of Capital Jury Composition
The obvious question is how well current voir dire practices
succeed in weeding out unqualified jurors. Here we turn to the Capital
Jury Project2 ("CJP"), which provides valuable insights into how the
the defendant's substance abuse did not mitigate his actions, and (4) that the defendant would be a future
threat to society"); Luginbuhl & Milddendorf, supra, at 275 (finding that a study of 325 North Carolina
venire members showed Widtherspoon-excludable jurors to be 'significanly less portivae of
aggravating circumstances than the remaining, death-qualified jurors vhile they did not differ with
regard to overall acceptance of mitigating circumstances").
51. Our conclusions in this area of the law concur in most rep cts with thoe of John Ho!dxridze.
See John Holdridge, Selecting Capital Jurors Unconintonly Wlling to Cendenn a Man to Die: Lat er
Courts' Contradictory Readings of Wainwright v. Witt and Morgan v. Illinois 19 MIss. C. L REv. 2.33
(1999). We do, however, differ vith his conclusion that the Constitution does not require that capital
jurors be able to consider specific mitigating factors. See id. at 303 n.84 (asserting that courts rzned not
permit the defense "to challenge for cause prospective jurors %, ho are unwilling to accord a 'pccifia
mitigating circumstance a certain (or indeed any) weight" (emphasis added)).
52. The Capital Jury Project "CIP") is a National Science Foundation-funded, multi-sta:t
research effort designed to better understand the dymamics of juror decision-making in capital case. The
CJP is a loose association of academics from different disciplines (primarily law and cimiio!o23 1 and
institutions who in 1990 began interviewing jurors in a number of different states %-ho had 5>rVed on
capital cases, some of which resulted in a sentence of death, and some a sentence of life impfisoerr-nt.
Analyses of the data collected during these interviec%s began appearing as early as 1993.
Quantitative analyses of CJP data can be found in William J. Bowers et al, Death Scnxrwinq
in Black and W$hite: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jurv Racial Cernpsitnin,
3 U. PA. J. CONsr. L 171, 189 (2001) (multistate data); Wrlliam J. Bowxers et al, Forcelosrj
Impartialt. in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions. Guilt-Trial Erprience, anl Preizature
Decision Making, 83 CORNL.L L REV. 1476. 1486 (1998) [hereinafter Bowers et al, Foreosed
Imparialiy] (multistate data); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death bi Defait: An
Empirical Denonstration of False and Forccd Choices in Capital Sentercing. 77 TEL. L REv. 6495. 643
(1999) (multistate data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Bia Was He Sort? The Roe ef Reir.orse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNEIL REV. 1599, 1599-1601 (1993) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eanbzrg &
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capital punishment system in general, and voir dire in particular, work in
practice. The picture it paints is not a pretty one, and confirms what
many experienced capital litigators believe from their own experience to
be true: the death penalty deck is often stacked against the defendant, not
by the facts of the case, but by the inclusion of unqualified jurors.
1. Automatic Death Penalty Jurors
The starkest failure of capital voir dire is the qualification of jurors
who will automatically impose the death penalty ("ADP jurors")
regardless of the individual circumstances of the case. For example, data
from South Carolina3 show that 14% of jurors who have actually served
in capital cases believe that the death penalty is the only acceptable
punishment for a defendant who has been convicted of murder.,"
Although 14% is an average of slightly fewer than two jurors per twelve-
person jury, that number is nonetheless significant. Studies of South
Carolina juries show that when eight or more jurors favored death in the
first vote of sentencing deliberations, death sentences were the final
verdict in greater than 87% of the cases-and when nine or more jurors
favored death on the first vote, all the juries studied returned a death
verdict.5 In contrast, when fewer than eight jurors favored death on the
Martin T. Vells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1
(1993) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors,
74 S. CAL L. REV. 371,373 (200 1) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility
in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 349-350 (1996) [hereinafter
Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility] (South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and
Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1538, 1539-40 (1998)
[hereinafter Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation] (South Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, The
Enotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L REv. 26, 28-30 (2000) (South Carolina data);
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?,
70 IND. Li. 1161, 1161-62 (1995) (North Carolina data); Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors
Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.
1183, 1188 (1995) (Kentucky data); Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as LegalAction: Death
Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistntst and Punitiveness, 33 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 461, 473-74 (1999) (multistate data); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution:
The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1559
(1998) (California data); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1112-13 (1997) (California data).
Qualitative analyses of CJP data to date can be found in Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the
Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. Li. 1137,
1138 (1995) (Indiana data); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials:
The Viewfrom the Jury, 70 IND. Li. 1103, 1121 (1995) (Georgia data).
53. CJP data indicates "that South Carolina jurors behave much like jurors in other states,"
Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra note 1, at 280 & n.10.
54. See Blume, MODERN MACHINERY, supra note 8 (manuscript at 8 tbl.1). Indeed, significant
minorities of jurors believed that death is the only acceptable punishment for some non-capital crimes
that do not result in a person's death. See id. (manuscript at 10 tbl.2).
55. See id. (manuscript at 33).
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first vote, none of the juries surveyed returned a death verdict! ' The final
outcome swings precipitously on a difference of only two votes. In
"close" cases, the inclusion of constitutionally unqualified jurors who
will automatically vote to sentence a convicted murderer to death results
in a devastating denial of the defendant's constitutional right to an
impartial jury and individualized consideration."
56. "The tipping point is juror eight. If juror eight goes with the prosecution and the jury raactes
unanimity, the result will be death; ifjuror eight goes with the defense, the result will be life." ELsenberg
et al, Forecasting, supra note 1, at 303-04 & tbL7 & nn.89 & 91.
57. See i. at 279 (observing that the seating of jurors whose avid support of the death penalty
renders them biased-and legally ineligible to serve---"push[es] the final verdict heavily toward dmth");
Richard S. Jaffe, Capital Cases: Ten Pfinciples for Individualized Voir Dire en the Deat Pen Vty,
CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 35,36 ("When it comes to the punishment phase, the vote of one or two
jurors will often be the deciding factor between life and death.").
In most death penalty states, for example, A&-insas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, IMississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey. New Mexico, New York.
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah.
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming, and in all federal district court and military court-martial capital
prosecutions, it takes only one juror to refuse to vote for the death penalty in a particular case before the
law requires that a life sentence be imposed. See Federal: 18 U.S.C. § 35931(c) (1994); Military: 10
U.S.C. § 852(b)(1) (1998) ("No person may be sentenced to suffer death, except by tl concurrence of
all the members of the court-martial present at the time the vote is taken and for an offens in this cltpz:cr
expressly made punishable by death."); Arkansas: ALK. CODE ANN. § 54-631a) (Michie 1997t
California: People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 928, 933 (Cal. 1994) (ho!ding that jurors musa
"unanimously determine that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors"); P e !e v.
Mtranda, 744 P.2d 1127, 1152-53 (Cal. 1987) C'Generally, unanimous agreement is not required on a
foundational matter. Instead, jury unanimity is mandated only on a final verdict or s-pcial inding. A
defendant is, of course, entitled to a unanimous jury verdict in thefinal dczemrzfation as tq peraty.");
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31.1(c) (1997) (if a sentencing jury "has unaninously found th-
existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance but is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as
to sentence, the judge shall dismiss the jury and shall impose a sentence of either life imprisonrnt or
imprisonment for life without parole"); Georgia case law emphatically favors unanimous jury voics in
sentencing verdicts, see Romine v. State, 350 SE.2d 446.450-51 (Ga. 1986); Illinois: 720 ILL Co,.iP.
STAT. ANN. 519-1(g) (West Supp. 2001) ("If the jury determines unanimously that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death."); Kansas: KAN. CRt. CODE ANN. § 21-4624(e) (West Supp. 2000); LouNiana: La.
CODE Crt PRoc. ANN. art. 905.7 (West 1997); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 4131i1 ISupp.
2000); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(3) (2000); Missouri: Mo. ANh. STAT. § 565.03104)
(West 1999) (death sentence will not be imposed if jury "is unable to decide or agree upon th:
punishment"); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630-.5IV) 12000); New Jersey. NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-3(c)(3)(c) (West 2000) (death sentence may not be imposed "[ilf the jury is un-b!e to
reach a unanimous verdict"); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 IMichie 20W); New Yor
N.Y. CRrusL PRoc. LAW § 40027(10), (1 1)(a), (d)-(e) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (jury must be unanimous
to impose either death sentence or life without parole); North Carolina: N.C. GtN. STAT. § 15A-2C0)fl$
(2000) (death sentence may not be imposed without jury's unanimous agrement); Ohio: Onto RE%.
CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 2001) (if the jury "unanimously finds, by proof i-yoni a
reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender v.as found guilty of committing
outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jurys all recommend to the court that the sentence of death be
imposed on the offender"); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (Vest Supp. 20011 (jury's
death-sentence verdict must be unanimous); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 11(lB), I 11(e) (19991
Oury may not determine defendant should be sentenced to death if one or more jurors do not bzliese
defendant should receive death sentence); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. § 971 l(clt I pi )-( I
(West Supp. 2001); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000) -l jury
shall not recommend the death penalty if the vote for such penalty is not unanimous as proviidd.1;
Tennessee: 'EINN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-2041gli2)(B) (Supp. 2000) (death sentence requires that all jurors
2001]
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sign verdict form stating that they "unanimously find that the punishment shall be death"); Texas: TEX,
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2000) (jury must be unanimous in returning special
verdicts adverse to defendant in order for the court to sentence defendant to death); Utah: UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(a)-(c) (1999) (jury must reach unanimous agreement in order to impose death
sentence); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D)(1) (Michie 2001) (written death-sentence verdict
specifies that the jury is unanimous); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.060(4),
10.95.080(1) (2000) (if jury unanimously finds insufficient grounds for leniency, it must impose death
sentence); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(b), (d)(ii) (Michie 2001) ("[1If the jury does not
unanimously determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, then the defendant shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole[,] or [to] life imprisonment.").
Indiana and Nevada require jury unanimity in sentencing recommendations, but in the absence
of a unanimous decision responsibility for sentencing passes to the court or to a panel of judges, which
may impose a death sentence; in Indiana, the court in any case is not bound by even a unanimous jury
sentencing recommendation. See Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(0 (Vest Supp. 2001) ("If a jury
is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation after reasonable deliberations, the court shall discharge
the jury and proceed as if the hearing had been to the court alone."), which the state supreme court has
held to mean that the jury may make a sentencing recommendation only if it reaches a unanimous
decision, see Hough v. State, 690 N.E.2d 267, 274 (Ind. 1997), but "[t]he court is not bound by the jury's
recommendation." § 35-50-2-9(e); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.556.1 (1999) (if jury is unable to
reach unanimous verdict on the sentence, the trial judge and two other judges appointed by supreme
court shall conduct penalty hearing, but death sentence may be imposed only by unanimous vote of
panel).
Alabama, Delaware and Florida, however, provide for the imposition of death sentences on
less-than-unanimous verdicts. See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (1994) (an advisory verdict
recommending a death sentence requires an affirmative vote of "at least [ten] jurors," and "an advisory
verdict recommending a sentence of life imprisonment without parole must be based on a vote of a
majority of the jurors"); Delaware: DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3) (1995) (jury's
recommendations on the two critical interrogatory issues are reported to the court "by the number of each
affirmative and negative votes on each question"); the jury's recommendations are not binding on the
court's determination of sentence, see Shelton v. State, 652 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. 1995) (holding that "the jury
makes a recommendation only--the ultimate decision is made by the trial court"); Wright v. State,
633 A.2d 329, 335 (Del. 1993) (holding that "the Superior Court bears the ultimate responsibility for
imposition of the death sentence while the jury acts in an advisory capacity"); State v. Cohen,
604 A.2d 846, 856 (Del. 1992); perforce a Delaware jury need not unanimously find the existence of a
statutory aggravator nor unanimously find that aggravators outweigh mitigators in order that the court
may impose a death sentence; Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(2)-(3) (Vest 2001) (simple
majority of jury suffices for advisory sentence, which is in any case not binding on the trial judge),
Jackson v. State, 530 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1988) (trial judge may accept death-sentence
recommendation by simple majority vote ofjury).
Connecticut, Kentucky and South Dakota do not unequivocally indicate whether the jury must
return a unanimous verdict to impose a death sentence. See Connecticut: State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318,
1352 (Conn. 1994) (holding that death sentence is mandatory only if the jury "determine[s] unanimously
that at least one aggravating factor exists and no mitigating factors exist"); but see id at 1373, 1388-90
(Berdon, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the state's death penalty statute requires that certain findings
regarding aggravation or mitigation be unanimous, but that at no place does the statute require the july to
declare a verdict sentencing the defendant to death-much less that it requires the jury do so
unanimously); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(I)(b), (3) (Michie 1999) (unanimity not
specified, although the statute refers to a sentencing "verdict," which implies a unanimous decision),
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (Michie 1998) (death sentence "shall not be imposed
unless the jury verdict at the presentence hearing includes ... a recommendation that such sentence be
imposed"; the reference to a "verdict" implies a unanimous decision); § 23A-27A-5 (death sentence
verdict must designate an aggravating circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard that
presumably requires unanimity). But for authority that a "reasonable doubt" standard does not absolutely
require unanimity, see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (holding that "want of jury
unanimity is not to be equated with the existence of a reasonable doubt"). Despite the ambiguity of these
three states' statutes, other sources of law may suggest that a requirement for jury unanimity is more
likely than not the rule in each state. The requirement for jury unanimity in criminal trials is venerable,
having become a settled rule by 1367. See, e.g., I WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY Or ENGLtSH
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Moreover, if we switch the focus from jurors who are ADP for all
murder, to jurors who are ADP when considering either the definitions
of murder (capital murder) or the aggravating circumstances that
actually make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, the picture
becomes bleaker. Data from Kentucky illuminate this disheartening
picture. Almost 30% of persons who serve as capital jurors in Kentucky
reported that they would automatically vote for the death penalty upon
conviction for capital murder.53 A related problem, even more prevalent,
is that a majority of capital jurors believe that if certain aggravating
LAW 318 (7th ed. 1956); James B. Thayer, The Jury and its De'elopment. Part 11, 5 K1%Rv. L RE%. 295.
296-97 (1892). This principle is not restricted to the guilty-or-not-guilty d-emination; the traditional
common law rle is that, "absent waiver, jury detenrinations of critical issues must be unanimous. This
requirement of unanimity generally extends to all matters submitted to the jut); it applies to the entire
jury detennination." Mills v. State, 527 A.2d 3, 12 (Md. 1987), vacatcd on other greands. Mills .
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). Legislatures may arplicity provide for non-unanious criinval jury
verdicts, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,410-13 (1972) (plurality opinion ; Johmson. 406 U.S. ct
362-65; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912) (dictum); Maxwell v. Dow. 176 U.S. 51.
602, 605 (1900) (dictum), but a statute is not to be consrmcd in derogation of long-es-ablished, familiar
common law principles, "except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evidernL" Isbrazdten Co. %.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,783 (1952); see also Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557,56511879) i"No matute is
to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It is not to be con,t.aeds
maldng any innovation upon the common law which it don not fairly express.").
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho. Montana. and Nebraska provide that ajury vill have no part in th2
sentencing. See Arizona. ARIZ. REV. STAT. A' . § 13-703 (West 2001) (trial judge to be sti! szn:cnxri;
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1998 & Supp. 20011 Isentencing heai n held
before a three-judge panel, presided over by the trial judge); Roxane J. Periso, Comment. Ard Then
There Were Three: Colorado's New Death Paealty Sentencing Statute, 63 U. COLO. L RErv. 1S9, 192-
93, 200-09 (1997); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(g) (?iEche 1997) ("Upon making the prescribed
findings, the court shall impose sentence xvthin the limits fixed by the law."); Montana: MON r. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2001) ("The [sentencing hearing must be conducted before the co:urt al o i .7);
Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2520 (Michie 1995) (sentencing performed by priiding judge or
by a panel of three judges appointed upon presiding judge's request to the state's Chief Justice, or three
other judges appointed upon the Chief Justice's determination that the pr,iding judge is di sab!cd or
disqualified). Nebraska statutes do not explicitly state whether a simple majority of a three-judge pznel
may impose a death sentence, but the Nebraska Supreme Court has recently held that a panel miu-si b
unanimous in order to sentence a defendant to death, See State v. Hochstein. 632 N.VL2d 273, 231-82
(Neb. 2001). The Nebrasa court held that the sentencing statute was open for judicial conistuction
because of ambiguous language, see id at 280, that the strict constrction of penal Etatutes in favor of a
defendant is a fundamental principle of statutory construction, see id, and that %,hra a pa=el does not
unanimously vote for a death sentence the district court must impose a life sentence, see id. at 281-V2 It
further stated that the policies of the state legislature, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the 'tre suprem.
court had consistently noted the need for reliability in capital sentencing decisions, no:ted te strong
correlation between a capital sentencing hearing and a criminal trial, and related that to Nebraska's
constitutional requirement for jury unanimity in criminal cases. See id at 282-83. Fnally, the cout
observed that the three other states that provide for three-judge sentencing panels--Co!orado, NzZ1a,
and Ohio--require by statute that the panel be unanimous in order to impose a death sentence. Sce.hL at
283.
58. See Dillehay & Sandys, supra note 50, at 158-59 (reating findings based on survey of 143
Kentucky felony jurors, that 28.2% of the respondents %%ho would not be disqualificd as juror unJ-r ,th.
Witt disqualification standard would nonetheless ahvays give the death penalty in cases involin.g
intentional murder); cf. Eisenbrg et aL, Jury Responsibiliy, supra note 52 at 359 tbL3. 360 (firJin-, on
the basis of interviews of 153 jurors who sat in South Carolina capital cases, that -nlauly on-thrd of
the jurors were under the mistaken impression that the law required a death sentence if the3 fo,.d
heinousness or dangerousness, a result replicated in a multi-state study of the intemiew db""
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circumstances are present then death is the only acceptable punishment."9
For example, 70% of capital jurors surveyed in eleven states felt that
death is the only acceptable sentence for a person who has previously
been convicted of another murder.6° Likewise, very substantial minorities
of jurors believe that the law requires them to impose a death sentence if
the defendant's conduct was "heinous, vile, or depraved," or if the
evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous in the future.
As discussed above, a state cannot make death the mandatory sentence
for any crime,62 and a juror who cannot set aside her belief that a death
sentence is the only appropriate sentence for certain crimes is likewise
constitutionally unqualified to serve on a capital jury.63
A variation on this problem is jurors who are ADP for certain kinds
of cases, even if those cases do not fall within the category of a
particular aggravating circumstance. For example, some jurors might
believe that anyone who rapes and murders a child deserves to die, and
in fact there are many such persons in the pool of potential jurors. 64
These individuals may be qualified for service in some capital murder
cases, but in a case involving the rape and murder of a child, they would
be an ADP juror, and therefore unqualified to sit.
2. Burden-Shifting Jurors
The death penalty can never be mandatory, 5 and indeed, in most
jurisdictions, the State bears the burden in each case of demonstrating
59. See Blume, MODERN MACHINERY, supra note 8 (manuscript at 10 tbl.2).
60. See id.
61. See id. (manuscript at 19 & tbl.6),
62. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13; see also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77-85
(1987) (striking down a Nevada law mandating the death penalty for the killing of a correctional officer
by an inmate serving a life sentence); Voodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "one of the most significant developments in our society's treatment of capital
punishment has been the rejection of the common-law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence
upon every person convicted of a specified offense").
63. See Morgan v. fllinois, 504 U.S. 719,729,735 (1992).
64. See Stephen P. Garvey, Affidavit U[ 9-11, State v. Delacruz (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 2000) (Nos,
99-GS-40-40936 to 99-GS-40-40939) (copy on file with the Center for Capital litigation, Columbia,
S.C.).
65. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (holding that an aggravating
circumstance must not apply to every defendant convicted of murder); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325, 333 (1976) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that evolving standards of decency had rejected the belief
that "'every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender' (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)));
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (holding state's broad mandatory scheme impermissible for its "failure to
allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted
defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death").
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that the death sentence is a permissible punishment." Thus, much like
the presumption of innocence at the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial,
there is an initial legal presumption that a life sentence, not death, is the
appropriate penalty, until at least the initial burden of proving the
pennissibility of a death sentence is overcome.6" Even at that point,
many states' laws place the burden of persuasion on the prosecution to
establish that the defendant should be sentenced to death.3 No
66. The death penalty is permissible only if the prosecution demonstrates, by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the existence of an aggravating circumstance; only then is the dfenant "death-
eligible" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153. 196-97 (1976) (plurality opinion).
67. See Beth S. Brinkmann, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a D:te Process
Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE LI. 351, 352-53, 357-73 (1934). for an anal)is of thz
constitutional underpinnings of this presumption, its essential role in capital sentencing, its implications
for the allocation of burdens to the prosecution and for procedural refbrmns and its fundamental
coherence with other basic constitutional and legal principles.
68. That is, once the prosecution fulfills the Gregg burden of establishing that the defendant is
death eligible by proving an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, such st"a-s require
that the prosecution clear yet another hurdle, by proving that aggravating circumstances ou:ci rh
mitigating circumstances, before the jury may impose a death sentence. This is the =U-1el of a
"weighing" statutory scheme. Here, we employ a somewhat broader definition of this nomenclaure than
the Supreme Court set forth in Zant v. Stephens. 462 U.S. 862 (1983), where it idntifi-- ',ighing"
statutes as ones that instruct juries to give special weight to particular aggravating citrm .csan-u-, "to
consider multiple aggravating circumstances ... more significant than a single such circumstance, or to
balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard." IL at 874; see
also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992) (observing that, at least in some appellate revizv
contexts, "the difference between a weighing State and a nonweighing State is not one of 'semantrcs"f.
As we use these terms here, "weighing" states require the sentencer simply to vieigh tle
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances in arriving at the sentencing decision. If
the jury finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, then it may nai impoee
a death sentence, but in most cases it is not obliged to impose a death sentence if a.qgravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. "Weighing' statutes may. however, require that ajury
impose a death sentence if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circurstance,
see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303. 306-07 (1990) (concluding that a s.atute may
constitutionally require a sentencer to impose a death sentence if it makes "certain findings aainst the
defendant beyond the initial conviction for murder"). or if the sentencer finds that a~gravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, see Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,377$ 19(0). In
"non-weighing" states, a death sentence is pennissible once the jury finds an aggravaing circum ntance
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the statutes give the jury no further specific guidance; it may consider all
circumstances of the case in determining whether a death sentence is warranted. See Zant, 462 U.S. at
874 (approving "non-weighing" statutory scheme).
The United States Mlitary is a "weighing" jurisdiction. See PC.L 1004. 1006, reprinted in
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAl, UNITED STATES 11-130, 11-134 (2000) (requiring, for impusition of a
death sentence, the jury to find unanimously, beyond a reasonable doubt the eistence of at least one
aggravating factor that "substantially outweigh[s]" any mitigating circumstances). The "veighing" st
are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaame, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mar)lanrA
Miisssippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamphlire, New Jersey, New Mexico. New York, North Carolina.
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. The "non-v.weighing" states are: Albama, Arizona,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina. South Dakoa, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-031a)12 (Michie 19971
(aggravators must exist beyond a reasonable doubt, must outweigh all mitigators beyond a reasonab!e
doubt, and must justify a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt); California: CAL. PE %. CODE
§ 1903 (Vest 1999); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(21$1b111llB) (West Supp. 20001
(sentencer is a three-judge panel); Connecticut: CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a!cHg) (West Supp.
2001) (aggravators must outweigh mitigators to impose death sentence); Delaware: Da. CoDE Az;.
tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)-(4) (2000) (jury must recommend to the court answvers to two interro,-ories, thee
2001]
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provisions specifying a "preponderance of evidence" standard for question of whether aggravators
outweigh mitigators), tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)b (specifying same weighing standard for judge in determining
sentence), but see Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248-51 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that Delaware is a
non-weighing state, because in determining whether a death-eligible defendant should be sentenced to
death, "the jury considers all aggravating circumstances, not merely those enumerated in the statute"),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1365 (2001); Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736,740, 743,745-49 (3d Cir. 1995)
(in bane) (stating that Delaware is a non-weighing state because in sentencing "[tihe jury is not restricted
to the statutory aggravating factors"); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 135 (Del. 1983) (finding "that it is
clear that Delaware does not have a 'weighing' statute as contemplated by the [Supreme] Court in
Zant"); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b) (West 2001) (jury must find whether sufficient
mitigators exist that outweigh aggravators); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(k)(2) (West Supp.
2001) (a death sentence may be imposed only if the sentencer finds that "any mitigating circumstances
that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances"); Kansas: KAN, CRtM.
CODE ANN. § 21-4624(e) (,Vest Supp. 2000) (if the jury finds "that the existence of ... aggravating
circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant
shall be sentenced to death"); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h)(l)-(3) (Supp. 2000) (if
aggravators outweigh mitigators, "the sentence shall be death"); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(3)(c) (2000) (jury must find there are insufficient mitigators to outweigh aggravators before
it may impose death sentence); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT ANN. § 29-2522(2) (Michie 1995) (sentencer
(the trial judge or a three-judge panel) must determine "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances
exist which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances"); Nevada: NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 175.554(3) (Michie 2001) (sentencer may impose death sentence only if it finds no
mitigators "sufficient to outweigh" aggravators); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV)
(1996) (jury may impose death sentence if it determines that aggravators "sufficiently outweigh"
mitigators); New Jersey: NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(3)(a) (West 2000) (sentencer shall impose death
sentence if aggravators outweigh mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt); New Mexico: N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-20A-2.B, 31-20A-4.C(2) (Michie 2000) (aggravators and mitigators to be weighed "against
each other"; death sentence may not be imposed if mitigators outweigh aggravators); New York: N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(1 1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (jury may not impose death sentence "unless
it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that" aggravators "substantially outweigh" mitigators);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)(2), (c)(3) (2000) (death sentence requires jury finding
that mitigators "are insufficient to outweigh" aggravators); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03(D)(1)-(3), (F) (West 2001) (if the jury "unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the
mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on
the offender"); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 2001) (jury shall not impose
death sentence if mitigators outweigh aggravators); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971 l(c)(1)(iv) (West Supp. 2001) (jury verdict must be death sentence if aggravators outweigh
mitigators, but otherwise death sentence not permitted); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(0(2)
(Supp. 2000) (jury may not impose death sentence if aggravators "have not been proven by the state to
outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt");
§ 39-13-204(g)(1)(B) (if aggravators "have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt[,] then the sentence shall be death"); see also
§ 39-13-204(g)(2)(A)(ii), (g)(2)(B).
For "non-weighing" states, see Alabama: Notwithstanding ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2)-(3)
(2000) (aggravators must outweigh mitigators for jury to recommend death sentence), section 13A-5-48
provides:
The process ... of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... shall not be
defined to mean a mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose
of numerical comparison. Instead, it shall be defined to mean a process by which
circumstances relevant to sentence are marshalled and considered in an organized fashion for
the purpose of determining whether the proper sentence in view of all the relevant
circumstances in an individual case is life imprisonment without parole or death.
Id. § 13A-5-48 (2000); Arizona: Aiuz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (West 2001) (trial judge is sole
sentencer); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1997) (jury to "consider" mitigators and
aggravators in determining sentence); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(c) (Michie Supp. 2001)
("Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to
death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented are sufficiently
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compelling that the death penalty would be unjust") (trial judge is sole sentener); Illinois:. 720 ILL
COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c), (g) (West Supp. 2001) (the sentencer shall "considar any aggravating and
any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty"); Kentucky KY. REI.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (lcihie 1999) (statute indicates only that santencer is to "conaider"
aggravators and mitigators); Louisiana: LA. CODE CRUM. PRrc. ANN. art. 905.3 (West 2001) ("A
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at I on
statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circurnsances,
determines that the sentence of death should be imposed."); Missouri: Notwithstanding Mo. Alm. STAT.
§ 565.030.4(3) (West 1999) (death sentence will not be imposed if sentencer finds mitigators 'Sufficient
to outweigh" the aggravators), § 565.030.4(4) provides for a non-weighing determination: a death
sentence will not be imposed "i]f the trier decides under all of the circumsnics not to asc-- and
declare the punishment at death."; Montana: MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (1999) (tlre court, as so!2
sentencer, shall impose death sentence if it 'finds that there are no mitigating circunstan-cas sufficimently
substantial to call for leniency"); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2(}1C) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2000) (in determining sentence, the sentencer shall "consider" mitigators and aggravators); South
Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 23A-27A-3 (Michie 1998) (juxy must determinz %,hether mitigators or
aggraators exist); § 23A-27A-1 (ury instructed only that it must "onsider" aggravators and
mitigators); § 23A-27A-4 (death sentence "shall not be imposed unless the jury verdict at the pre-en-e
hearing includes a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance"); § 2AA-27A-5 Idath-sntrcie
verdict must find an aggravator"beyond a reasonable doubt'); Utah: UTAH CODEANN. § 76-3-20741fbl
(1999) ("non-weighing" element of statute predominates "weighing" element; death penalty may be
imposed only if "the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outwaigh toal
mitigation, and is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the d2ath p=alty
is justified and appropriate in the circumstances."); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 192-264.4B, C,
D(l)-(2) (Michie 2001) (statute gives no guidance to the jury as to how it is to assess evidenc in
mitigation and aggravation in determining sentence; written verdict forms indicate only that jury is to
have "considered" all such evidence); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.l03). (4,
10.95.070 (2000) (in deliberating, thejury is to determine an answer to the question. "are you convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to m2rit leniency?"; the
Code sets forth a non-exclusive list of relevant factors jury may "conider" in deciding ,hetlr lenieny
is merited); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(dlti[C), (dlii) (Michle 2001) n"=T , ere nunber
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no indepndent significance," and jurors
shall individually and collectively "consider" aggravating and mitigating circumstances.); swe also
Stephen Hombuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Proccdure: A Letal Oddity in the Spren-e Court s Case
Law, 73 TEc. L REV. 441,447-49 & nrn.5 & 38 (1994).
The federal government is a "non-weighing" jurisdiction, although the wording of the statute
governing the deliberations of federal capital juries might at first glance appear to suggest otherwis:
If an aggravating factor.., is found to exist, the jury, or if there is no jury. thz court.
shall consider whether all the aggravating factords] ... sufficiently outweigh all the
mitigating factor[s] ... to justify a sentence of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factr,
whether the aggravating ... factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of d2ah. Based
upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no jury, the coumt hll
recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonmnt
without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)(3) (1994). Although the statute includes the %vord "outweigh," that indicaite th-
subjective normative judgment the law directs the jury to engage in, and not a mechanical or arithmetic
formula imposed on the jury.
Oregon and Texas require sentencing juries to address specified interrigatozy isues; neither
state's law quite fits into the "weighingtnon-weighing' scheme. See Oregon: Ot.. RE%. STAT.
§ 163.150(l)(b)(A)-(D), (1)(c)(A)-(B), (1)(d) (1999) (jury must determine four interrogator issues.
regarding deliberateness of defendant's conduct and disregard therein for human life, defendant's future
dangerousness, unreasonableness of defendant's response to any provocation, and "[wihether the
defendant should receive a death sentence"; court instructs jury simply to "consider" mitigators in
determining those issues, and thus this scheme is more akin to those of non-waighing jurisdictions);
Texas: TEX. CODE CRt PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(l)-,2). (e)(l) (Vemon 2000) (jury mut reiter
special verdicts on two issues, and then answer a further issue asking ~hthr "there is a sufficient
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to \varrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a
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jurisdiction requires a defendant to prove she should live. Nonetheless,
many-perhaps most--capital jurors enter the sentencing phase of the
trial having shifted those burdens, possessed of the presumption that the
conviction for murder means they should impose the death penalty, and
(at best) that the defendant had better come up with some really good
reason for them to conclude otherwise.69
3. Mitigation-Impaired Jurors
As Justice Scalia's dissent in Morgan points out, the inability to
consider just one statutorily-enumerated mitigating factor renders a
capital juror constitutionally unqualified.0 Nonetheless, CJP data
convincingly demonstrate that a substantial number of empaneled capital
jurors are indeed "mitigation-impaired." A constitutionally-qualified
capital juror must be willing and able to consider and give effect to
mitigating evidence.7' That does not mean she will return a life sentence
every time such evidence is shown, but that at least in some degree such
evidence will increase the likelihood that she will favor a life sentence.
If such evidence has no effect on the juror-or if she feels even more
inclined to vote for a death sentence if such evidence is shown-then she
is constitutionally unqualified, because she is not able and willing to
give effect to mitigating evidence.
CJP data indicate that large numbers of jurors are, in fact,
mitigation impaired-unable or unwilling to consider particular
death sentence be imposed"; in the presentation of that third issue, this scheme appears more akin to
those of non-weighing jurisdictions).
69. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1089-90 & tbls.5-6 (1995) (finding in study of actual capital jurors that one-
half had made up their minds as to penalty once they had convicted the defendant and that 64.6% of
those who took a stand for either death or life before the sentencing phase of the trial said they were
"absolutely convinced" of what the punishment should be, raising doubts as to their ability to be
impartial); Bowers & Steiner, supra note 52, at 662-63 ("This prevalence of jurors who formulate their
position on the defendant's punishment [usually in favor of a death sentence] before the sentencing stage
of the trial begins, and stick with it thereafter, for all or most of trial and deliberations, raises a serious
question about the effectiveness of jury selection procedures." (footnote omitted)); Bowers et al.,
Foreclosed hpartiality, supra note 52, at 1486-1539 & tbls.l-12 (identifying and assessing factors that
contribute to early punishment decision-making in the CJP jurors); Eisenberg et al., Forecasting, supra
note 1, at 304 n.90 ("Some CJP research also suggests that many jurors actually decide how they will
vote on the defendant's sentence before the penalty phase even begins."); Eisenberg et al., u y
Responsibility, supra note 52, at 360 ("Nearly one-third of the jurors were under the mistaken impression
that the law required a death sentence if they found heinousness or dangerousness."); Eisenberg & vclls,
supra note 52, at 12-14, 38 n.12; William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L 1, 41 (1987-88)
(finding that a significant number of jurors believed that the death penalty was mandatory or presumed
for first degree murder); Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1226 (finding
that "jurors who are misled by the capital instructions into believing that the judicial formulas dictate a
certain outcome in their deliberations usually have the outcome of death in their mind").
70. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,744 n.3 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See id at 728-29.
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mitigating factors-and thus constitutionally unqualified. For most of
these jurors, the problem is not that they are unable to consider any form
of mitigation, but that they are unable to consider certain forms of
mitigation. If a juror says that a certain form of mitigating evidence
would have no effect on her, or, worse yet, would make her more likely
to vote for death, the juror is unqualified to serve in cases where
evidence of that given form of mitigation will be proffered. By that
yardstick, 90% of capital jurors are unqualified to serve in cases where
drug addiction is part of the defendant's case in mitigation.'- While drug
addiction is an extreme case, many other classically mitigating factors
are not seen as mitigating by substantial numbers-often heavy
majorities-of actual jurors:
PERCENTAGES OF JURORS WHO Do NOT SEE CLASSICALLY MITIGATING
FACTORS AS MITIGATING"
Defendant Was a Drug Addict 90.3%
Defendant Was an Alcoholic 86.3%
Defendant Had a Background of Extreme Poverty 85.0%
Defendant's Accomplice Received Lesser Punishment in 82.9%
Exchange for Testimony
Defendant Had No Previous Criminal Record 80.0%
Defendant Would be a Well-Behaved Inmate 73.8%
Defendant Had Been Seriously Abused as a Child 63.0%
Defendant Was Under 18 at the Time of the Crime 58.5%
Defendant Had Been in Institutions But Was Never Given 51.8%
Any Real Help
Defendant Had a History of Mental Illness 43.9%
Defendant Was Mentally Retarded 26.2%
There is no question that the law of mitigation is in conflict with
many jurors' views on these issues. Another example is intoxication. In
virtually every state, intoxication, whether by drugs or alcohol, is a
statutorily designated mitigating circumstance.74 But, to many jurors, not
72. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 52, at 1559 tbl.4.
73. See id. (percentage totals include jurors vho were "much more:. slightly more," and -jut as"
likely to '%ote for death" if the stated factor were present).
74. See, eg., State v. Pierce, 346 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (S.C. 1986) ("Evidence of voltmary
intoxication is a proper matter for consideration by the jury in mitigation of p unishn- nt.", avermld on
other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324-28 & n.5 (S.C. 1991) (Tcal, J.. -parala
concurring opinion joined by majority) (abolishing doctrine of infavorem vitie). This prpnL-=rt leal
doctrine is to be distinguished from the long-prevalent common law princip!e that voluntary intoxicalion
was no defense to a finding that a defendant possessed the mens r.a as a rquisite clemert of an
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only is intoxication not mitigating, it is aggravating, and in cases where
intoxication is present, such jurors are unqualified."
CJP data reveal one final flaw related to mitigation, though it is
difficult to discern whether this is a screening problem, an instruction-
comprehension problem, or some combination of the two. Jurors
misapprehend the law concerning the burden of proof by which
mitigating evidence must be measured. Jurors frequently believe that
they may consider only mitigating factors mentioned by the judge, that
mitigation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that findings
concerning mitigation (like those concerning aggravation) must be
unanimous. These assumptions, however, have no basis in the applicable
law. In South Carolina and North Carolina, significant minorities of
jurors- 16% in South Carolina, and 24% in North Carolina-believe,
incorrectly, that they may consider only those mitigating factors that the
judge specifically mentions. 6 This misapprehension is also found in
other jurisdictions. Well under half the experimental jurors in a Cook
County, Illinois, study understood that they could consider mitigating
factors not specifically enumerated by the trial judge.n
Alarmingly, 51% of South Carolina jurors and 41% of North
Carolina jurors believe that a mitigating factor must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt for it to provide a basis for sentencing a defendant to
life; only 26% of South Carolina jurors understand that a mitigating
factor need be proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction, and only
24% of North Carolina jurors understand that a mitigating factor need be
offense-indeed, many historical authorities expressed the sentiment that voluntary intoxication was
"'an aggravation of the offence."' Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-47 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Lord Coke and a consistent line of authority). The Egelhoff pluramity acknowledged, however,
that American law moved away from that position during the nineteenth century, and that by the
beginning of the twentieth century, "in most American jurisdictions, intoxication could be considered in
determining whether a defendant was capable of forming the specific intent necessary to commit the
crime charged." Id. at 47. As of 1996, approximately ten states had not adopted this common law
development, or had statutorily repudiated it. See id. at 48 & n.2.
75. Of the CJP jurors surveyed, 13.6% found the influence of alcohol aggravating, 68.0% said it
would not or did not make a difference, and only 18.3% deemed it mitigating; 17.9% found the influence
of other drugs aggravating, 63.7% said it would not or did not make a difference, and only 18.5%
deemed it mitigating. See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation, supra note 52, at 1555 tbl,2. These
sentiments should not be surprising. The intuitive popular judgment of the significance of voluntary
intoxication in assessing an individual's responsibility for criminal acts conforms to the sentiments of
early common law authorities reviewed in Egelhoff, and presumably reflects a straightforward reasoning
that responsibility for acts committed while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs flows from the
individual's initial choice to consume the intoxicant. The venerable authority for, and the persistence of
the perspective noted by, the Egelhoff plurality underscores the vital role of voir dire in screening and
educating venire members in capital cases where intoxication will be an element of the mitigation case if
the trial reaches the sentencing phase.
76. See Blume, MODERN MACHINERY, supra note 8 (manuscript at 16 tbl.4).
77. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising
and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224,230 (1996).
[Vol. 29:1209
HeinOnline -- 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1230 2000-2001
PROBING "LIFE QUALIFICATION'
proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction.' This finding is
particularly striking in North Carolina, where such misconceptions
should be dispelled by the instructions jurors receive specifying that a
mitigating factor must be proved simply to an individual juror's personal
satisfaction.7  These levels of misunderstanding-or recalcitrant
insistence on another standard-can be outcome-dispositive because, as
noted previously, there is a very small range of numbers over which
differences in initial juror opinions are crucial.""
I. How AND WHY VOIR DIRE FAILS
If voir dire is designed to weed out unqualified jurors, why do so
many end up serving on capital juries? The answer lies both in what
does happen in the typical capital trial voir dire, and in what does not.
A. Perverse Effects of the Voir Dire Process
If we examine what the process of death qualification itself is like,
it becomes clear how that process can affirmatively thwart the very
objects it is designed to achieve.
1. Skewing Jurors' Perception of the Law on Capital Punishment
Towards Death
Many persons called for jury duty have never been in court prior to
their voir dire, and have never been before a judge sitting in her official
capacity. In voir dire they are repeatedly asked by the judge if they can
"follow the law" and impose a death sentence.' Although this question
on its face inquires into a juror's capacity to return a death sentence,
jurors are likely to infer that a death verdict is actually required by the
law, at least under some, as yet unspecified, circumstances. That is, it
gets the juror to think "Oh, I get it. They're asking me if I can kill this
guy. Yeah, I'll do that if that's what I'm supposed to do."
[D]eath qualification may come to resemble a kind of "obedience drill"
in which jurors feel they are voluntarily relinquishing the power to
78. See Blume, MODERN MACHINERY, supra note 8 (manuscript at 15-17 & tblA.
79. See id. (manuscript at 16 n.21). The North Carolina stature enumerates mitifating
cirumstances, and requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence; the state's jury izniztfivns.
however, suggest that mitigating circumstances require proof only to a juror's per-onal saiisflUzat. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (cl)-(3) (1999); State v. Johnson. 257 S.F2d. 597. 617-18
(N.C. 1979).
80. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying txt.
81. See Hirsclzhom 's Mernorandwn in Support of Motion to SubnmitJu " Qarstifieaire. 13 CQim.
Prac. Rep. (P &F) 318,318-19 (Aug. 11-25, 1999) [her-inafterHirscidtom"s Men:rardira].
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deviate from the outcome "the law" seems to favor.... [Tihe personal
characteristics of death-qualified jurors render them especially
receptive to arguments that they must follow the implicit "promise"
made to the court.82
Nor is this conclusion merely a matter of intuition. Mock jury
studies show that exposure to the death qualification process makes a
juror more likely to assume the defendant will be convicted and
sentenced to death; more likely to assume that the law disapproves of
persons who oppose the death penalty; more likely to assume that the
judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney all believe the defendant is guilty
and will be sentenced to die; and more likely to believe that the
defendant deserves the death penalty." Moreover, the misleading effects
of this focus are entrenched and amplified when the prosecutor addresses
the jurors in closing argument of the sentencing phase and reminds them
of their voir dire "promise" that they could give the defendant the death
penaltyU
There are other clues regarding authority that jurors in voir dire will
absorb subconsciously, and then may use to interpret the events of the
trial and to structure their thinking about the appropriate penalty. For
82. Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the
Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1482 (1997).
83. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1303 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (assessing studies showing
that going through death qualification increases willingness of individual jurors to convict and condemn,
as well as resulting injuries that are more disposed to reach those outcomes), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (discussing 1979 study); see also Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301,
1356 (Cal. 1980) (rejecting study findings as inconclusive), superseded by statute, CAL. CtV. CODEI
§ 223 (West Supp. 2001); Cowan et al., supra note 50, at 55-75 (examining studies that almost
universally conclude that death qualification produces juries more predisposed to convict than non-death-
qualified juries); Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 147 (1998) (discussing effects of death qualification on jurors' propensity to
convict capital defendants); Haney, Selection of Capital Juries, supra note 50, at 122-32 (setting forth
experimental study results, finding that because discussion of the death penalty pervades voir dire, jurors
become more disposed to conclude at the close of evidence that they should impose a death sentence);
James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2097 (2000) [hereinafter
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death] ("[B]y repeatedly forcing jurors during the pretrial voir dire to
contemplate the imposition of death, [death qualification] mak[es] them substantially more likely to vote
for death when the time comes."); Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital
Punishment, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1599, 1613 (2001) ("'Even though 'the law' does not actually purport
to tell the jury which sentence to choose, many jurors misinterpret the trial judge's legal instructions and
manage to convince themselves that 'the law' dictates a certain sentencing result."' (quoting Joseph L.
Hoffman, How American Juries Decide Death Penalty Cases: The Capital Jury Project, in THE DEATtl
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CuRRENT CoNTovERsIEs 333,341 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997))).
84. For an example of an appellate court's finding no error in such an argument by the
prosecution, see People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1992). In Noguera, the court concluded "that
the specific questions posed by the prosecutor on voir dire simply inquired whether a juror would
consider the death penalty if the defendant were 18 or 19 and only I person had been killed and were
thus not improper," and on that basis rejected the defendant's argument "that the prosecutor's reference
in his closing penalty phase argument to the voir dire questions and the jurors' answers to them
overcame the jurors' natural reluctance to impose the death penalty in this case." Id. at 1187-88.
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example, in many jurisdictions after the judge questions each juror, it is
the prosecutor's turn to voir dire the juror, and defense counsel goes last,
even though it is rare for the law to require any particular order." This
convention, however, allows the prosecutor to frame the discussion in
important respects, leaving defense counsel to respond to that framing."
It also allows the prosecutor to signal her position as an authority figure;
for example, it puts her in a position to explain legal concepts, to get a
commitment from jurors to abide by the law in particular respects, and to
point out and introduce defense counsel and the defendant to the juror."
2. Tainting the Juror's Account of Her Own Beliefs
The second perverse effect of capital case voir dire stems from the
way in which the judge's initial questioning, rather than illuminating the
juror's beliefs, often suggests desired answers. Because many jurors are
intimidated by the unfamiliar and formal setting, they are subject to
subconscious pressures to respond to the authority figure-the judge-
by replying in conformity to what they get the sense their answer
85. But see N.Y. CRIt PRoc. LAW § 270.16 (McKinney Supp. 2001) (providing that in a Capital
trial, "the court shall, upon motion of either party. permit the parties. conurmnchnq w ith the przp!e. to
examine the prospective jurors individually and outside the presence of the ot r pro-pecti e jurors
regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors" (emphasis added)).
86. See Walter L. Gerash, Liabiliivfor Trampoline Intv,, in 45 As!. IJ t. 2D Protf of FatU § 11
(1986) (arguing that, in civil suits, "[b]y virtue of going first on voir dire and opening F marnnt,
plaintiff's counsel has the advantage of communicating the first total picture of the case to the jury,
giving the jurors a working hypothesis about the total picture that is to unfold")- John A. Call. Handliq
the Juw" T7e Psychology of Courtroom Persuasion, BRIEF, Spring 1937, at 47. 50 J-hA1ll other thing
being equal, the argument heard first is more persuasive than thi heard second unlass a ignificant
amount of time has elapsed between the two.").
87. See Transcript of Record (Post-Conviction Relief) at 539.549-51, Hughes v. Moore (S.C. Ct.
Corm. PI. Oct. 13,1999) (No. 98-CP-09-101) (Thomas, J.) (expert testimony of John Mauldin, Grn% ilLe
County (S.C.) Public Defender) (copy on file with the Center for Capital Litigation, Colutmbia S.C.). Mr.
Mauldin's testimony about the significance of going first in voir dire is reprinted below
Mauldin: [During voir dire, the prosecutor at trial] went in first every tima, %%tch is just hat
you might in my business say is an absolute no-no ....
Mauldin. mhat is not the %ay it ought to be done.
Q.: Why does it matter?
Mauldin. [L]et's say, if Juror No. I comes into the courtroom and is questioned fir-- by th
[prosecutor], the [prosecutor] essentially gets to "teach" the juror the meaning of statutor)
aggravators, mitigation, mitigating circumstances, bifurcated trial, so he does a lot of...
teaching during the ... early questions to that juror. If he is allowed the fi-t bita... at t:e
apple on every juror, then it's difficult to ... get an objective view of how all these jurors
feel.




HeinOnline -- 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1233 2000-2001
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW
"should" be.88  The typical three-category death-penalty-opinion
framework that many trial courts pose to jurors in voir dire,89 though
designed to expedite the for-cause challenge process, has the unintended
consequence of making introspection and honest responses extremely
difficult.
The first category is described as composed of jurors who will
always vote for the death penalty if the defendant is convicted of
murder, no matter what evidence the defense might raise to show that
the defendant should not be sentenced to death. The second category
consists of jurors who will always vote for a life sentence if the
defendant is convicted of murder, no matter how horrific the murder,
and no matter what evidence the prosecution might raise to show that the
defendant deserves the death penalty. The third and final category
comprises jurors who have not decided what the penalty should be if the
defendant is convicted of murder, but will want to listen to all the
evidence and testimony submitted in the penalty phase and consider it
with an open mind. Depending on what they hear, these jurors may come
back with either a death sentence or a life sentence.
This is typical of the text as presented to the venire:
1. There is a type of juror who, once the crime of murder has been
proved by the State and the juror is considering punishment, feels that
he or she is required to give the death penalty in each and every case.
This juror simply feels that once a murder has been committed, the
death penalty is the most appropriate punishment no matter what the
circumstances of the case.
2. The second type of juror is one who, although the guilt of the
defendant has been determined, under no circumstances could ever
give the death penalty. This juror would not need to hear what the facts
and circumstances in aggravation or mitigation in this particular case
were because the juror would have his or her mind made up
concerning punishment no matter what he or she heard.
88. See Hirschhom's Memorandum, supra note 81, at 319-20; see also Dees, supra note 1, at 15
("Jurors are terrified about explaining their feelings on sensitive subjects to strangers."). Juror fears are
similarly present when voir dire is conducted by the court:
Venirepersons will frequently hide their true feelings ... when asked about them publicly,
particularly by the judge, who[,I robed and physically elevated, deferred to and addressed as
"Your Honor" is the most powerful figure in the courtroom. Jurors will ... conceal prejudice
in order to avoid embarrassment and disapproval by the judge.
Hirschhom's Memorandum, supra note 81, at 319-20.
89. As early as 1985, the South Carolina Supreme Court endorsed this as a proper conceptual
framework for ascertaining the constitutional qualification of capital jurors. See State v. South, 331
S.E.2d 775, 777 (S.C. 1985) (rejecting claims that the inquiry "improperly steered" jurors).
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3. The third type of juror is one who, although the guilt of the
defendant has been determined, would not have his or her mind made
up in advance concerning punishment. This juror would need to hear
the facts and circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation and would
want to listen to and follow the law as the judge charges the jury
before he or she could make the decision regarding punishment, and if
the facts presented so warranted this juror could bring in a verdict of
life imprisonment. Also, if the facts presented so warranted, the juror
could bring in a verdict for the death penalty:0
When the judge presents the prospective jurors with these three
general categories,91 it is obvious which category upright and responsible
citizens should choose. Category one is for cold-blooded, heartless
killers; its description signals that such a view is unduly harsh and
closed-minded-who would not listen to evidence before making a
decision? Category two is for panty-waist liberals; its description signals
that the second view bespeaks a contemptible inability to come to grips
with reality-what sort of person would never consider a death sentence
no matter hww bad the murder? That leaves category three, which is for
regular people. To anyone unencumbered by a law degree, the signal is
clear.92
The official position on the adequacy and efficacy of such
categories and questions-that the jurors are under oath, and so will give
truthful and therefore reliable answers-blithely ignores the
psychological dynamics at play-and the "invisible but lethal currents of
90. Transcript of Record at 35-36, State v. Nance, 466 S.E-2d 349 (S.C. 1996) (No. 243631
[hereinafterNance Record] (copy on file with the Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, S.C.I.
91. For an example of how ajudge orally propounds this to ajuror.
The Court: Now, in dealing with the penalty phase, there are generally three types ofjurons.
There's no right or wrong answers; it's just philosophically how people feel Some jurors sal
that where an individual has murdered another, I will al,ys be for the death penalty. Sorez
jurors, with equal emphasis, say even though a murder has been ... committed. I %,ill r.ever
be for the death penalty. There is a third class of jurors that say even though the defendant
has been convicted of murder, I will consider all of the facts in the case and then I %-.ill ddcide
whether or not murder [sic] is appropriate or life imprisonment. Some. jurors Say al',ays;
some say never. The third class say, well im willing to listen; I could do eith r one
depending on how I feel. Would you classify yourself as juror numberone. two or three?
Transcript of Record at 157, State v. Johnson, 525 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 2000) (No. -5047) (copy on fi: with
the Center for Capital litigation, Columbia, S.C.).
92. See Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and its Progcny: A Proposcd Amrndrn to Fde 24
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race. and Gcnder-Nczaral Jt'
" 
Sekceion
Process, 80 IowA L REV. 1327, 1349 (1995) ("Judges routinely ask questions such as, 'Can yoa b_ fair
and impartial?' for which the 'correct' answer is obvious to a veniremember. Those % erreuemrnb-rs v, ha
want to be on the jury respond 'correctly,' and judges generally believe their urresealing aswem"); sae
also Charles R. Garry, Attacking Racism in Court Before Trial, in MINt ,NtZG RACISM I r;rtvTJ.tus
xxii (Ann Fagan Ginger ed. 1969) (writing that the typical judge's idea of voir dire is to simpl c.k the
prospective juror whether he can be fair, "even though Adolf Hitler himself would have aisercd that
question in the affirmative").
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prejudice" latent in the venire." It erroneously presumes "that actual bias
means "'consciously held bias."'' To a court operating on that
presumption,
93. See ABA GUIDELINEs, supra note 2, Guideline 11.7.2 cmt.; see also James H. Gold, Voir
Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 IND. LJ. 163, 178
(1984-85) ("The assumption that jurors will follow the law appears to be based primarily on wishful
thinking."); Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted VoirDire:An Empirical Investigation of
Juror Candor, 11 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 131, 145 (1987) (concluding from an empirical study that "the
presumption was not supported that potential jurors who have taken an oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth, necessarily do so .... [I]t is apparent that jurors are not as candid as we presumed.").
Examples of juror untruthfulness and the unreliability of jurors' statements under oath are
legion. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 698-700 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that actual
prejudice was shown where juror failed to disclose that his brother was a deputy sheriff); United States v.
Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1529-34 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (reversing verdict and remanding for new trial, finding
that actual bias and prejudice were shown where juror intentionally failed to disclose prior associations
with defendant and prior involvement in criminal and civil litigation); United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d
768, 769-71 (4th Cir. 1980) (reversing two guilty verdicts, upon finding that juror had failed, "for reasons
of shame and embarrassment," to admit that several of his relatives were convicted felons, when asked
on voir dire if any of his family members had ever been convicted); State v. Freeman, 605 So. 2d 1258,
1259-60 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (granting death row inmate new trial after finding that jury foreman
failed to disclose, in response to question posed by defense counsel during voir dire, that he was a former
police officer), overruled by Brown v. State, No. CR-98-0343, 1999 WL 784128, at *5 (Ala. Crim. App.
Oct. 1, 1999) (clarifying the law relating to juror misconduct allegations made for first time in
postconviction petitions, under requirements for newly discovered evidence in Alabama Rules of
Criminal Procedure); Abercrombie v. State, 574 So. 2d 879, 879-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (finding
reversible error where potential juror, who was mother of a girl that defendant had previously raped,
failed to answer truthfully in voir dire whether she had an interest in conviction of defendant); Clark v.
State, 551 So. 2d 1091, 1092-94 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (affirming appellate reversal of conviction,
where one juror did not reveal during voir dire that he had previously served as juror in another drug case
in which he had voted for the conviction of the (different) defendant); Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320,
324-25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (reversing first-degree manslaughter conviction and remanding for new
trial where juror chose not to admit during voir dire that she knew the facts of the case, that the victim's
brother-in-law was the juror's immediate supervisor at work, and that she had discussed the facts of and
opinions about the case with her supervisor, "at length on several occasions"); Thompson v. O'Rourke,
339 S.E.2d 505, 506 (S.C. 1986) (affirming denial of motion for new trial in civil malpractice case, but
conceding that in voir dire two jury members had concealed that the prevailing party's attorney (or other
members of his firm) had previously handled real estate transactions for them); State v. Gulledge, 287
S.E.2d 488, 489-90 (S.C. 1982) (reversing and remanding for new trial, on ground that juror failed to
respond affirmatively to voir dire inquiry into whether "any potential jurors were related by blood or
marriage to present or former police or law enforcement officers," when she was related by marriage to a
deputy sheriff who had been at the scene of the crime, had assumed custody of defendant, and was
present in courtroom throughout trial).
Several examples illustrate the amount of juror untruthfulness and unreliability that permeated
just one case. One juror who served on a California capital jury that sentenced the defendant to death
replied on the juror questionnaire that she had not been the victim of a crime, and that she had never had
experience with any persons who were sexually or physically abused when they were children, or with
any persons who sexually and physically abused children. When the District Attorney asked her on voir
dire whether she had been the victim of a crime, the juror mentioned only that about seventeen years
earlier two children had burglarized and vandalized her home. This juror did not disclose that when she
was thirteen years old a businessman giving her a ride home raped and assaulted her. See Joint Statement
of Disputed and Undisputed Facts for Evidentiary Hearing at 2-3, Sims v. Calderon (C.D. Cal. June 12,
2000) (No. CV-95-5267-GHK) (copy on file with Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, S.C.);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing at 4-7, Sims v.
Calderon (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1998) (No. CV-95-5267-GHK) [hereinafter Memorandum of Points and
Authorities] (copy on file with Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, S.C.).
A second juror responded untruthfully on her questionnaire that in reading about the case in a
newspaper she had not been informed of any of the "facts" of the case, when in truth she was aware of
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a juror who [swears] he [will] judge the case solely on the evidence
presented at trial [is] taken at his word, no matter what his actual
predisposition [may be]. But such a restrictive and wooden approach to
voir dire is unsupportable in light of the unassailable truth that direct
and general inquiries about juror bias cannot be expected to uncover all
forms of partiality.95
True, most jurors will not consciously lie;" instead, they will
summarily try on each hat for size, and decide that the most attractive
one fits. This commonsense conclusion is affirmed by both the CJP data
discussed in Part I, and by actual voir dire records. Those who have
conducted or observed capital-case voir dire will universally confirm
that it is rare to hear a juror volunteer, "No, I can't promise to be fair to
both sides, and I can't promise to follow the law," and that jurors
infrequently identify themselves as other than a category-three juror.
Moreover, most of those who do step outside the obviously preferred
category will identify themselves as category-two, or Witherspoon
excludables. It is uncommon to hear a juror admit to being a category-
one, automatic death penalty juror, and yet the CJP data show that such
individuals are in reality abundant on actual capital juries.97
many material, substantive, and prejudicial facts of the case, including the conviction of the defendant's
purported accomplice. During voir dire the juror untruthfully denied that she recalled any of thz
substance of what she had read. Then, during the trial, she violated the judge's instructions and her oath
as a juror by discussing with other jurors the accomplice's conviction, and %hat ti accomplice's life
was like in prison. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra, at 7-9.
A thirdjuror lied by denying that she mew any victims of abuse. In fat hb husband %-as just
such a victim. Then, during sentencing deliberations, she tainted the other jurors by telling them about
her husband's experiences, and suggesting that the effects of the defendant's superficially similar
experiences of abuse did not mitigate his subsequent violent acts. See id. at 13-15.
94. People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 1981) (quoting No'e, Voir Dire Establishing
Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptoty Challenges. 27 ST,,u,. L REv. 1493 (19701
(restricting voir dire questions to inquiries conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause).
superseded by statute, CAL. Ctv. PRoc. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 2001); see also Silverthore v. United
States, 400 F.2d 627,638 (9th Cir. 1968) (recognizing "that in the absence of an examination design d to
elicit answers [that] provide an objective basis for the court's evaluation, merely going through the form
of obtaining jurors' assurances of impartiality is insufficient [to test that imparialityl" (alteration in
original) (quoting Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 1963))).
95. Wi/liams, 628 P.2d at 873 (citations omitted); sce also Goins v. McKon, 605 F.2d 947, 953
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
96. But see supra note 93 and infra note 131 and accompanying text.
97. The rarest-virtually nonexistent--response, despite judges' explicit invitation of it. is an
assertion by the juror that her views do not correspond to any of these three categories.
Court: Now after you read those three categories could you place yourself in any one of those
categories?
Juror: Yes, sir.
Court: Which one did you place yourself in?
Juror:. The third one.
Defense Counsel [Y]ou indicated type three?
Juror. Yes, sir.
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Observers have also noted that of the small number of jurors who
initially identify themselves as category-one (or ADP) jurors, many
quickly backtrack and re-categorize themselves as qualified-to-sit threes
under pressure from judges and prosecutors; in contrast, those jurors
who initially describe themselves as category-two jurors, and, as a
consequence, appear not to be death-qualifiable, rarely can be
"rehabilitated" into category-three jurors by defense counsel." There are
two reasons for these disparities in rehabilitation.
First, although this sort of judicial behavior is not readily subject to
quantifiable analysis, experienced capital defense practitioners
frequently have the impression that judges are quicker and more fluent
in backing down venire members who initially self-identify as category-
one jurors from their absolutist position, compared to their handling of
those who initially call themselves category-two jurors. This is not
necessarily attributable to a judge's consciously favoring a death-
sentence outcome. Instead, it is probably a symptom of the broader
problem associated with death qualification. It psychologically
insinuates in trial participants the assumption that death is the optimal
outcome." The mission of death qualification means that judges look at
the whole process through the mental lens of this thought: "The ability
to give death is what we're looking for.' '""o Therefore, when a juror says,
Defense Counsel: But you understand that there are more than three types of people?
Juror Yes, sir.
Nance Record, supra note 90, at 37-38.
98. See Jaffe, supra note 57, at 36 ("Unfortunately, the process favors the prosecution; jurors who
conscientiously oppose the death penalty rarely retreat from their position. By contrast, jurors who
initially say they would vote for the death penalty for anyone convicted of murder can often be easily
rehabilitated by prosecutors soliciting assurances that they can be fair and follow the law, regardless of
their beliefs."). But see Michael T. Nietzel & Ronald C. Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir Dire
Procedures in Capital Murder Trials, 6 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1, 7 n.8 (1982) ("It is generally believed
that a skillful defense attorney can, in the course of individual sequestered voir dire, rehabilitate or 'save'
most venirepersons whom the prosecution would challenge because of their anti-death-penalty
sentiments.').
99. A recent article has analyzed lower court decisions as having read Witt broadly, to allow
prosecutors to ask case-specific voir dire questions as bases for challenges for cause, while reading
Morgan narrowly to preclude such questions and challenges by the defense.
These courts have reasoned that because the state capital punishment statute authorizes the
death penalty under the facts of the case to be tried, a prospective juror who cannot fairly
consider this punishment under those facts is a prospective juror who is unable to follow the
law. However, courts have almost universally refused to extend that reasoning to defense
challenges for cause.
Holdridge, supra note 51, at 301. Holdridge has identified an excellent example of how the law of capital
punishment and the process of qualifying capital jurors easily and pervasively refocus the outlook of trial
judges away from the impartiality that should be their highest duty. See id. at 302-03. Instead, many trial
judges slip into the assumption that death is the goal of the law and the process, not merely an option.
100. Put another way, the task of death qualification leads judges to conceive of the core problem
(or issue or mission) in capital jury selection as "Looking for someone who can impose a death
sentence"; they fail to apprehend that a task of equal constitutional urgency is "looking for someone who
can impose a life sentence."
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"Sure, I'd always sentence a convicted murderer to death," the judge
naturally thinks, "We've got just a little glitch here; we need to get rid of
the 'always."' In contrast, when a juror says, "Sure, I'd always sentence
to life," the judge automatically thinks, "We've got two problems here;
we would need to get rid of 'always' and get rid of 'life."
A second reason for the more frequent backpedaling by category-
one jurors may lie in psychological differences between category-one
and two jurors. Category-one jurors are likely to associate their views
with those held by persons in authority, tend not to perceive their own
position as being in opposition to that of the State,0 ' and therefore are
predisposed to follow the lead of the judge if she points toward category
three as the one desired.'" Category-two jurors, in contrast, more often
conceptualize their views as a dissent from the authoritative position of
the State, and therefore are less likely to moderate their views in
response to the desires of an authority figure, such as a judge.
B. Inadequate Individualized Questioning
Thus, voir dire tends both to prime jurors for the death penalty, and
to prime them to say that they could return either a death sentence or a
life sentence, and that they would consider "the situation and all of the
evidence." But this is only half of the problem. When skilled defense
lawyers are permitted to thoroughly explore those statements, they are
able to uncover some of the jurors who are really ADP jurors (at least for
certain facts), and are not capable of carrying out the constitutional
obligations of capital jurors.'"3 Unfortunately, many judges sharply
restrict such exploration, and many defense lawyers are not very adept in
the precise, yet fluid, inquiry that is required.
Very few protections for the rights of the accused are calculated to
expedite criminal proceedings, and the voir dire necessary to safeguard a
capital defendant's right to a fair trial is no exception. Judges face strong
pressure to curtail those protections and thereby save the extra time they
require. 4 First, judges must deal with the administrative pressure of
crowded dockets. Second, they have legitimate concerns over increased
101. Cf Thompson et al., supra note 50, at 111 (concluding from an Cxl..rimantal empirical stuiy
that compared to jurors in general, death-qualified jurors tend to favor the State in interpreting t-ctinmny.
require less evidence to convince them of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and are more I1cly to
convict).
102. See Fksher, supra note 92, at 1314849 (discussing empirical studies shoving tut jurors
readily grasp what judges want to hear and answer accordingly).
103. See, eg., Jaffe, supra note 57 at 37-38.
104. For example, when ajuror "says one thing but actually means another,.] .... [flor the sa e of
judicial economy and expediency, judges will quickly accept the juror's v.ords at Ece value." Id. ct 37.
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state expenses and increased juror inconvenience, both of which are, or
at least seem to be, implicated by expanded voir dire.n0 5 Third, trial
judges in many death-penalty jurisdictions are elected, °6 and in the back
of their minds, they may worry that voters will not be pleased by
measures that make it harder for the State to convict accused murderers
or to secure the death penalty upon convictions. ',
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, judges' rulings on the scope
of voir dire also suggest that they often misunderstand the law in this
area. Many courts severely restrict the scope of inquiry they permit
counsel in voir dire, believing and asserting that the extremely limited
questioning they do allow is sufficient to ascertain which jurors may be
unqualified-even though "the evidence suggests that a single question
or a narrow line of questioning may be a poor means of determining
[whether] prospective jurors think in ways that may impede their
compliance with the constitutionally imposed standards.""' Despite the
105. But see United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 370 n.42 (7th Cir. 1972) (expressing
sympathy with the trial judge's desire to expedite voir dire, but stating that "expedition is clearly
subsidiary to the duty to impanel an impartial jury").
106. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Benveen the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 776-80 (1995)
(explaining that judges in nearly all capital punishment states are elected).
107. See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, 78
TEx. L. REv. 1839, 1839-45 (2000); Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, supra note 83, at 2112
nn.197-99; see also John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and
Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-75 & n.39 (1998) (reviewing the effect
of political pressures on local and trial court death-penalty decisions, and political attacks on state
appellate court judges).
On the other hand, one article has concluded that Arizona's experience with a law that invests
capital-case sentencing authority solely in the trial judge indicates very little politicization of judges
arising from the pressures of capital trials-although the sole authority cited in support of that
conclusion, the testimony before the Colorado legislature of the Chief Counsel of the Criminal Appeals
Section of the Arizona Attorney General's Office, is surely neither disinterested nor incontrovertibly
authoritative. See Perruso, supra note 57, at 208. We suspect that the article's more illuminating insights
on the political pressures judges face in death penalty cases may be found in its discussion of the reasons
Colorado adopted a statute removing capital sentencing authority from juries, placing it instead with a
panel of three judges. Proponents of the statute claimed that "the people" of the state were frustrated that
Colorado juries were refusing to impose death sentences, and wanted "a workable death penalty." Rd, at
206 & nn. 98-100 (citing, as authority for ascertaining the will of the people of Colorado, the legislative
testimony of the Chairman of the Capital Litigation Subcommittee of the District Attorneys' Council,
and a state senator, Ray Powers). One state senator forthrightly stated that the purpose of the legislation
was to produce more death sentences. See id at 207 & n.103 ("Why don't we then just say that we want
more death penalties ... ?"). Senator Powers, who sponsored the bill, explicitly acknowledged and
welcomed the politicization of judges on the issue. He assumed that in the wake of the judicial
sentencing statute the issue of the death penalty would "come] up in appointing judges .... [and] if they
have a liberal bias against the death penalty, maybe they should not be retained." d at 208-09 (quoting
statement from Senate hearings). Colorado's public defenders and defense attorneys, with less
enthusiasm, agreed on the likely results of the statute, see id at 210, and a Denver District Court judge
publicly expressed concern that the statute might "'politiciz[e] the appointment of judges in terms of
whether they favor the death penalty or not.' Id at 212 (quoting Judge Lynne Hufnagel).
108. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 52, at 1503; see also United States v.
Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that general questions were "too broad" and "might
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Supreme Court's clear statement in Morgan, that general inquiries into
whether a juror can "be fair" and "follow the law" are too superficial to
detect jurors "who cannot perform their duties in accordance with law,"
and thus are inadequate to secure a defendant her constitutional due
process right to a fair and impartial jury,'o' many jurisdictions severely
limit the questions that counsel may ask on voir dire."" Appellate courts
have upheld trial courts' refusal to let defense counsel ask whether jurors
are willing to consider.. as mitigating factors such things as emotional
and physical abuse, young age, and limited inteligence;"- youth or
voluntary intoxication; 3 refusal to let counsel explore jurors' attitudes
toward drug and alcohol intoxication as a mitigating circumstance;14
refusal to allow "open-ended inquiries about possible mitigating
evidence";"5 and refusal to let defense counsel ask jurors to speculate
not reveal latent prejudice"); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Natural
human pride would suggest a negative answer to whether there ,as a reason the juror could not be fair
and impartial. A juror might well answer negatively in good faith, without stopping to coaLndv tle
significance or firmness of impressions he might have gained from new reports. We thdk the qwestion is
not adequate to bring out responses showing that jurors had gained inforn:ation and fonrmd opinions
about relevant maters in issue if in truth any had." (emphasis added)); Cathy F- Beantt. PsycJw!ogical
Medrods of JurySelection in tie Typical Criminal Case, CMt1. DEF., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 11, 13 JJutJes
usually do not realize that they are seen by jurors as both powerful and fair, and that this attitudez on the
part of jurors creates an expectation in their minds that they should say they can be fair and impartial.
whether or not this is true."); Hirschhorn's MAenorandum, supra note 81, at 320 (Ceurt have
consistently recognized that jurors are often unaware of their ovm prejudices and prceptior-s, and do
not acknowledge them when publicly asked general questions on rair dire such as whtzilmr tlh e is any
reason they cannot be fair and impartial.").
109. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,726-27,729,734-35 (1992) (asserting that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of an impartial jury gives defendants the right to challenge
prospective ADP jurors for cause, the exercise of which requires voir dire Ieyond "general fairness" and
"follow the law" questions).
110. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted Morgan to upho!d trial courts'
limitation of voir dire regarding mitigating circumstances, It has held that Morgan does not require
questioning concerning specific mitigating factors, but simply recognizes the right of a capital dzfendant
to challenge for cause any prospective juror who indicates that she %,l automatically vo:e for a in
every case of a convicted murderer. See State v. Powers, 501 S.F-2d 116, 121-22 (S.C. 1993).
Accordingly, the state supreme court concluded that Morgan does not require the trial court to permit a
defendant to voir dire jurors on "how they would be affected by evidence of mental impairnuet. age. and
other mitigating circumstances, since such questions would 'stake oua' [a] juror and p!edge him to a
future course of action." Id. at 122 (quoting State v. Skipper, 446 S.E.2d 252, 261-63 (N.C. 1994)).
"[G]eneial questions as to whether [a] juror would consider mitigating circumstances as charged by the
judge are sufficient." Id. at 122.
111. Compare the constraints courts commonly impose on defense inquiries with the California
Supreme Court's generous interpretation of prosecution inquiries. In Pcople %- Noguera, 842 P2d 1160
(Cal. 1992), in which the court concluded "that the specific questions posed by tha proscutor on voir
dire simply inquired whether a juror would consider the death penalty" notvithstanding particular
mitigating factors, "and were thus not improper." Id. at 1188.
112. See United States v.Tipton, 90MFId61,878(4th Cir. 1996).
113. See Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 2000), cer. dcnied. 121 S. C. 2 (2000.
114. See McQueen v. Scroggj, 99 F.3d 1302, 1329 (6th Cir. 1996).
115. Plantz v. Massie, No. 99-6075,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13017. at *36(10th Cir. June 9, 2000i
(ascribing trial court limits on voir dire to Oklahoma state law).
20011
HeinOnline -- 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1241 2000-2001
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
about circumstances they would consider to be mitigating. 1 6 The most
common justification for upholding such restrictions is the view that
these questions are attempts to "stake out" jurors,17 committing them to
a certain course of action in advance. "8 Some courts, notwithstanding
Morgan, Penry, Eddings and Lockett, have actually ruled that a juror is
not disqualified if she views a certain mitigating factor, such as youth, as
aggravating." 9
Thus, although the Supreme Court has said that jurors are
unqualified if they cannot ever find that certain factors would constitute
sufficient mitigation to warrant a life sentence, rather than a death
116. See McCarty v. State, 904 P.2d 110, 115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (ruling that trial court's
prohibition was not an abuse of discretion, especially in light of counsel's ability to determine, through
proper questioning, whether jurors could follow instructions to consider mitigating evidence). The South
Carolina Supreme Court has upheld a trial court's ruling not to permit the defendant "to ask jurors
whether they would consider that [the defendant] did not have a significant prior criminal history of
violence." State v. Hill, 501 S.E.2d 122, 127 (S.C. 1998). In response to the defendant's position that
Morgan stands for"the proposition that general questions about whether a juror would follow the law are
not adequate in voir dire," the state supreme court asserted that the United States Supreme Court had
"held the defendant was entitled to know ifjurors would consider general mitigating evidence. The Court
did not hold that the defendant was entitled to know if a juror would consider specific mitigating
evidence." Id. at 127.
117. The term "stake out" has also been applied to voir dire in general, non-capital criminal cases.
See State v. Rogers, 656 So. 2d 768, 771-72 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that counsel's inquiry
improperly attempted to introduce testimony concerning specific sequence of acts); State v. Jones, 491
S.E.2d 641, 647 (N.C. 1997) (finding counsel's questions would confuse the average juror at the stage
where no evidence or instructions on applicable law were properly before jury, stating that questions
would tend to "stake out" jurors, and eliciting a pledge to a future course of action (quoting State v.
Vinson, 215 S.E.2d 60, 68 (N.C. 1975))); Anne M. Payne & Christine Cohoe, Jury Selection antd Voir
Dire in Criminal Cases, 76 AM. JUR. Trials § 31 (2000) ("Voir dire questions [that] attempt to 'stake
out' the jurors and determine what kind of verdict the jurors would render under a given set of
circumstances are improper, even where the questions are posed as hypotheticals." (footnotes omitted)
(citing State v. Nobles, 515 S.E.2d 885, 894 (N.C. 1999))).
118. See Soria, 207 F.3d at 244 (finding that questions on specific mitigating factors were
"attempt[s] to improperly commit the prospective jurors to a certain view regarding mitigating evidence
anticipated to be presented in this case"); 7ipton, 90 F.3d 861, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding defense
counsel neither requested that a specific "reverse-Witherspoon" question be put to any specific juror, nor
objected contemporaneously to the district court's mode of inquiry as to basic death penalty attitudes,
and the trial court's refusal to question or allow detailed questioning about specific mitigating factors
was not an abuse of its discretion); State v. Myers, No. 96-CA-38, 1999 WL 94917, at *36 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 1999) (ruling that Morgan "does not require trial courts to allow individual voir dire and
separate questioning of jurors regarding their willingness to consider specific mitigating factors"-but
that "inquiries of that kind should be allowed concerning any mitigation that the juror may be asked to
consider," and that the trial court's limits on questions concerning jurors' "willingness to consider
separate, specific mitigating factors" nonetheless left the voir dire "adequate to reveal any bias against
mitigation that would render a juror ineligible to serve," and thus was not an abuse of discretion); State v.
Dixon, No. 68338, 1997 WL 113756, at *18 (Ohio Cr. App. Mar. 13, 1997) (stating that counsel may not
"improperly survey prospective jurors on specific mitigating factors [that] are going to be introduced at a
later stage of the proceedings," notwithstanding the court's recognition that Morgan "prohibits the trial
court from restricting proper jury questioning about a juror's ability to consider relevant mitigating
factors"); Plantz v. State, 876 P.2d 268, 279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (permitting questions on particular
mitigating circumstances "would make voir dire an open forum for discussion of any circumstances
accompanying the murder, both mitigating and aggravating").
119. See Vuong v. Scott, 62 F.3d 673,680 (5th Cir. 1995).
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sentence, lower courts frequently prohibit the questioning of potential
capital jurors on just those points. Moreover, some judges not only
forbid discussion of specific mitigating factors as "staking out," but also
forbid open-ended hypothetical inquiries ("What might you want to hear
about in considering whether any mitigating factors exist?") on the
theory that they encourage jurors to think about factors that ultimately
may be irrelevant to the case.'-" What can an attorney do then? If counsel
cannot ask about factors relevant to the particular case and cannot ask
hypothetical questions, what is left? Only questions so general that they
are unlikely to elicit anything more thoughtful than the same "right"
answer suggested by the judge's initial question about the three
categories of jurors.
C. Incompetent Voir Dire
A defense attorney conducting voir dire in a capital case faces
urgent tasks: she must identfy jurors that she can effectively challenge
for cause, employ questioning techniques that will enable her to
challenge ADP jurors for cause, identify jurors who are appropriate
targets for peremptory strikes, use effective methods to "rehabilitate"
and "save" from state challenges-for-cause those jurors who have
reservations about the death penalty, and "educate jurors as to their
rights to be free from harassment and disrespect so that they can exercise
their individual judgment, regardless of the group dynamics."' -' The
truth is that many defense attorneys are not particularly good at this
crucial aspect of capital defense.
120. See People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2 4 (Colo. CL App. 1982) (holding that the trial court "gave
counsel full opportunity to question jurors regarding any matters [thatl might have shon bias or
prejudice .... Hence, its limitations on the use of hypothetical questions were well vithin its diszretion
and will not be disturbed on appeal"); State v. Poole, 214 S.E.2d 774, 775-76 WN.C. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that trial court did not err in sustaining State's objection to defendant's qu stion in voir dire
asldngjuror to speculate on how he would respond to other jurors' disagreeient with his poition); Sue
v. Patterson (Patterson 1), 351 S.E.2d 853, 854-55 (S.C. 1986) (finding no error in trial court's
determination that hypothetical questions posed by defense counsel to b improper); Ste %,. Szuth 331
S.E2d 775, 778 (S.C. 1985) (holding that "the purpose of voir dire is to insure ezzh juror cza make a
decision based on the evidence presented, rather than hypothetical evidence.")- see al.a Kcrpzr, s yra
note 1, at 9 (arguing that asking jurors hypothetical questions to detemiina how they might decid- an
issue is generally deemed objectionable and should be distinguished from questions fa se to unover
similarities from jurors' past experiences).
Other authority takes the position that hypothetical questions should not be barred in voir dire.
See Payne & Cohoe, supra note 117, §§ 31,58 (arguing that counsel can use hypotlieticals "in voir ditre
to explain the proper application of the law, provided, however, that the hypotLtical does not contma
away the need to prove the only disputed element of the offense, or othervise seek to determrin in
advance ajuror's opinion concemring the wveight of certain evidence." (fiotne:s ontted 1l.
121. Jaffe, supra note 57, at42 (emphasis added).
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Probably the most common shortcoming is the failure to establish a
common language; jurors frequently do not understand what attorneys
and judges are talking about. Jurors, of course, do not understand the
law.'2 They come to court, naturally and understandably, with all kinds
of misconceptions about the law, and with a wholly inadequate
understanding of how lawyers use the language of the law. We in the
profession are used to dealing with the arcane and stilted parlance of our
trade every day, but jurors are not."
Even after only a year of law school, it is difficult for law students
to remember how strange and counterintuitive they once found the
language to which they have become accustomed. It is therefore not
surprising that after years in practice or on the bench, when lawyers and
the judge start talking to jurors about the jurors' views on the death
penalty for someone convicted of "murder," the lawyers assume that the
jurors know what "murder" means. Jurors, however, do not reflexively
restrict the meaning of "murder" to the definition found in the state penal
code.
For example, in South Carolina, murder is defined as "the killing of
any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied."'24 But
when jurors are asked their opinions or views about the appropriateness
of the death penalty for someone convicted of murder, and, as
experienced capital practitioners hear time and time again, respond that
122. The CJP data emphasize the seriousness of this problem by revealing how widespread
misconceptions about the law are among jurors who have already served in capital trials. The CJP jurors
have been through voir dire (ostensibly certifying them as constitutionally qualified), have heard from
defense counsel and prosecutor, have received the judge's instructions on the law, and have presumably
applied the law as instructed. If any group of people would be "lay experts" on the law of the death
penalty, one would expect it to be these jurors. Nevertheless, their responses reveal deeply troubling
misconceptions about the law, illustrating profound shortcomings in the system, which surely begin in
voir dire, when--because of ill-founded restrictions or counsel's shortcomings-courts fail to screen out
unqualified jurors, and attorneys are unable or fail to educate properly jurors who are theoretically
qualified, but vulnerable to misconceptions about the law that will render them ADP in practice.
123. The confusion over legal language that people who are not legal professionals experience
during voir dire is substantially the same as that which jurors experience at the other end of the trial,
during jury instructions.
Capital instructions typically employ "complex language, unfamiliar words, one-sentence
definitions of terms, and many sentences with multiple negatives." Jurors interviewed by the
Capital Jury Project commented on how difficult the instructions were to understand. Others
noted that their requests for clarification simply led the judge to reread the instructions. When
asked, "What do you remember most about the judge's instructions?", several jurors reported
that they were lengthy and hard to remember. Others said the instructions, "were full of legal
talk," and "very long and complicated, hard to retain and interpret as fast as he was reading
it."
Peter A. Barta, Note, Betveen Death and a Hard Place: Hopkins v. Reeves and the "Stark Choce"
Between Capital Conviction and Outright Acquittal, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1429, 1458 n.213 (2000)
(quoting Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 52, at 1169); see also Blume, MODERN MACWINERY, supra
note 8 (manuscript at 36); Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 52, at 15.
124. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
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"it would depend on the circumstances" of the case, many of these
potential jurors are not contemplating circumstances attendant to the
intentional killing of another human being with malice aforethought.
Instead, all too often the potential jurors are thinking of "circumstances"
that would make the act or incident a killing in self-defense, an accident,
an act in the "heat of passion," a product of insanity; that is, they are
thinking of circumstances that would make the crime not a murder at all,
let alone a capital murder.'2- "Accordingly, [defense lawyers] must frame
questions that clarify the inquiry and focus entirely upon whether the
prospective juror can consider any punishment but death for someone
who intentionally, without legal justification, takes the life of another
person."'2 6
Furthermore, many (perhaps most) of these laypeople do not
understand that murder-intentional killing unredeemed by self-defense,
accident, insanity and so on-without more is not a death-penalty-
eligible crime in any American jurisdiction. An aggravating
circumstance must be established before it is even permissible to impose
a death sentence.'27 Juror misconceptions about this and other legal
principles arise out of an enormous gap in understanding, and
unfortunately courts and lawyers often do not take the time to educate
jurors on the legal contours of murder as a crime, nor to find out their
views on this complex area of law and life.
Moreover, language barriers are far from the only obstacle to
competent voir dire in a capital case. Even experienced trial lawyers
125. For example:
The Court: [To a self-described category-one juror] [l]n every event where a murder Ua
been committed, you feel .... no matter vwat the circumstances, that the death p alty is the
most appropriate punishment. Is that correct?
Juror Yes, sir.
The Court: And no matter what the circumstances are?
Juror I guess if it vas like self-defense murder, I mean like if someone was trying to kill ir,2
broke in my home and was trying to kill me and I killed them before they could kill mz.
The Court: So there are some circumstances where you wouldn't think the death penalty is
the most appropriate punishment?
Juror Yes, sir.
The Court: Are there any other ones that you can think of?
Juror. Just self-defense of my child or myself.
Nance Record, supra note 90, at 45. The court excused this juror sra spante following voir dire by
prosecution and defense and further questioning by the court, see id at 51 but her misundeslandin. of
the concept of "murder" illustrates the chasm of understanding that separates legal professionals from
most potential jurors.
126. See Jaffe, supra note 57, at 38.
127. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (ho!ding that bzzause
the Georgia death penalty statute channeled the jury's discretion by requiring that "it must fin and
identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a pmalty of dzath," th stat hA
appropriately guarded against the chance that a jury might "wvantonly and freakishly impose the dath
sentence").
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typically have little formal training in voir dire for any type of case (civil
or criminal), let alone in the highly specialized field of capital voir dire,
and in many states, capital cases are the only time an attorney, as
opposed to the judge, will conduct voir dire. In addition, because of
limited funding available for appointed counsel in capital cases in many
states,'1 the attorneys representing indigent defendants in capital cases
128. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crinte but
for the Worst Lmyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843-44, 1853-55 (1994) [hereinafter Bright, Counselfor the
Poor]; Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEo. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 14, 16, 18 (1996) (discussing state
techniques for appointing capital case lawyers, including patronage selections without regard for
experience; low-bid contract systems; and low-budget reimbursement schemes with piece-work rates for
a limited number of motions); Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital
Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1992) (criticizing Alabama's
compensation limits for discouraging thorough representation at the trial level); Bruce A. Green, Lethal
Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendnment, 78 IOwA L. REV. 433, 492-93 (1993)
(criticizing low compensation for appointed counsel as discouraging the private bar from developing
capital trial expertise); Joe Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 673, 677-82 (1989) (pointing out that underfunding and consequent understaffing create
burdensome workloads, and thereby profoundly undermine the chance for effective representation);
Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minnum Wages Paid
Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RurGERS L. REV. 281,310-14 (1991) (discussing how limits on
reimbursement can drive counsel's effective hourly wage below the minimum wage); Albert L.
Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 626, 642 (1991) (arguing that .'per case
maximums present an immediate threat' to the indigent accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel");
Mary Flood, What Price Justice?, Hous. CHRON., July 1, 2000, at IA (concluding that even recently
increased pay for appointed capital attorneys falls far below what a skilled attorney can receive from a
paying client); Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2000, at Al (quoting statements by Chicago's former chief prosecutor and current mayor,
Richard M. Daley, that "lawyers in some [capital] cases were incompetent, and even when they were
competent they often did not have the money to conduct their own thorough investigations and compete
against the police and [better financed and highly experienced capital] prosecutors"); Editorial, No
Money for Justice: State Will Help Prosecute Death-Penalty Cases but Falls Short in Ensuring a Fair
Defense, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2000, at A22 (inveighing against the Pennsylvania legislature's
refusal to allocate money for capital case defense, despite appropriated state funds to help local
prosecutors in death penalty cases); Sara Rimer, Questions of Death Row Justice for Poor People in
Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (describing that low compensation rates often make
appointed capital trial counsel decide to limit work on a capital case to one-tenth, or even one-twentieth,
the time necessary for adequate preparation, and discourages good lawyers from taking such cases more
than once); Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A, N.Y. TtMEs, July 16, 1995 (Magazine), at 21 (comparing
capital representation by well-staffed Philadelphia public defender office to that by underpaid appointed
counsel; few, if any, public-defender clients are sentenced to death, while from 1993-1995, thirty-three
defendants represented by appointed counsel were sentenced to death); Editorial, Rush to Death, ST.
PErERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at 16A (discussing a Florida case in which a "young, inexperienced
lawyer who knew little about presenting a capital defense" not only did little for his client, but was
deplorably underpaid, and presented no witness to testify about defendant's "long history of mental
illness" because as the attorney later testified in court, "he could not afford to call witnesses"); Stan
Swofford, A Reasonable Doubt: Are There Innocent People on North Carolina's Death Row?,
GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Aug. 6, 2000, at Al (comparing North Carolina's cap on compensation for
appointed counsel representing indigent capital defendants, to the local "free-market" rate for an
experienced criminal defense lawyer, which is about 135% higher).
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are often inexperienced.'29 For the defense, all too often, a capital trial is
"amateur hour," while the State is usually represented by a skilled,
seasoned prosecutor.' This imbalance of professional competence,
which skews every part of a capital trial, often preordains a jury
consisting of jurors predisposed to impose the ultimate punishment, even
if the judge is inclined to permit extensive voir dire.
IV. MAKING VOIR DIRE IN CAPITAL CASES EFFECTIVE
Voir dire in capital cases is very difficult even without the burdens
and barriers often imposed on defense counsel. Prospective capital jurors
have difficulty in expressing their views, and have reasons to
misrepresent them; as a consequence, neutral, nonsuggestive questioning
by the judge is essential, as is the opportunity for extended, detailed
follow-up questioning by competent defense attorneys."'
129. See, e.g., Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 128. at 1843 n49. 1857-6,5 (pro~idinrg
numerous examples of incompetent capital defense lawyers); Coyne & Entzeroth. supra no:e 128, at 14-
19 (citing numerous postconviction cases documenting the assignment of capital cases to la rs v%ho
had no criminal-much less capital-trial experience and were only a few months at the bar or. in one
case, was a third-year law student; and lawyers who got to trial without having r=d the state's capital
sentencing statute, who thought the governing statute was one overturned year, before. or %hze lis of
"criminal" cases read in preparation for trial consisted (in too) of Miranda and Dred SeiAt); Johnson,
supra note 128 (identifying as a "common thread" in miscarriages of justice in capital cases that "p)ry
financed, often incompetent defense lawyers [have] failed to uncover and present crucial evidzn:e": and
giving various examples "from around the nation of [death penalty] laNyars vho slept through trials, or
came to court drnk" or who were assigned to handle capital cases despite "specializing in tax law...
[and] never [having] tried a criminal case").
130. See Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 128. at 1844-45.
131. See Neal Bush, 77e Casefor Erpansive Voir Dire, 2 L,,, & PSYc'HOL REv. 9, 12-14 & n.14
(1976); Interview with Clive A. Stafford Smith. Executive Director. Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center
(New Orleans), in Lake Charles, La. (Mar. 14 1996) (discussing the subject of juror evasiverzss in
capital-trial voir dire, and the crucial need for the trial attorney to sustain focus in the difficult and
involved task of drawing out a venire member's actual vie%% s on the death penalty); see aro ,Az,. FxGav
GINGER, JURY SELECION IN CRIINAL TRIALs: NEI TECHNIQL-S A,.D CON"CEPTS § 726, at 296-97
(1975 & Supp. 1977) (quoting expert testimony in a high-profile case. UnitcdStaies %, Baker (W.D.S.D.
1974) (No. Cr. 73-5021) (arising out of the Wounded Knee incident), to the effect that two ,jr yc~s
showed that venire members consciously and deliberately lied under oath. and that tnityfairmindrd
individuals were more likely to befonhright to the court about the possibility of being biased, and thus
were more likely than truly prejudiced jurors to be excused for cause); Dees. supra note 1. at 14 ("Put
simply, prospective jurors lie. Put more generously, jurors give socially accptab!a answers"); Jaffe,
supra note 57, at 36 ("If we ask appropriate and skillful questions, a number of jurors will zdmit th-es
beliefs [that death is the only appropriate punishment for anyone convicted of murder].").
Judicial opinions, too, have observed that a person's unquestioning confidence in her o%',m
fairness is a powerful signal that others should subject that assumption to close scrutiny. See eg.. Peop!e
v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869,873 n.2 (Cal. 1981) (remarking "that the accuracy of a pers-n's emtinition of
his own fairmindedness is likely to be inversely proportional to the depth of his actual prejudces and
predispositions"), supersededby statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 2001 .
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A. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Suggestive Judicial Questioning and Staging
As discussed in Part III, even if jurors are not intentionally
misstating their opinions, the structure of the questioning process
encourages ADP jurors, in particular, to describe their beliefs
inaccurately. Eliminating the initial and suggestive choice between three
simplistic categories should be the first step in a genuinely illuminating
voir dire. The judge can, instead, productively begin inquiry into a
juror's attitudes by asking an open-ended question' such as "How
would you describe your attitude toward the death penalty?" For jurors
whose answers are vague, or nonresponsive, judges should be prepared
with alternative phrasings, such as "How do you feel about the death
penalty?," or "When, if ever, do you think its appropriate?" The
importance of nonsuggestive questioning has been well-documented
with respect to eyewitness identification and other examples of memory
recall.'33 We think that if a juror cannot coherently answer such a
question without suggestion, she is not qualified to sit as a juror in a
capital case. Moreover, if a juror in response to nonsuggestive
questioning articulates a disqualifying view, "rehabilitation" is
inappropriate.""
Second, there can be no question that individual, sequestered voir
dire of venire members is far more effective at encouraging jurors to
132. The virtues of this approach were noted in People v. Crowe, 506 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1973), in
which the court recognized "the danger that a biased juror may be unwilling to confess that bias openly,
and that questions to which there is a 'right' and a 'wrong' answer may be less likely to reveal such bias
than more open-ended questions." Id. at 204 n.31.
133. See Bill Nettles et al., Eyewitness Identification: 'I Noticed You Paused on Number 7hree',
CHAMPION, Nov. 1996, at 11, 12 (noting that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbids a lineup that is "unnecessarily suggestive"); Gary L Wells & Eric P. Seelau,
Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUBS.
POL'Y & L. 765, 767, 775-78, 785-87 (1995) (discussing how even inadvertent, subconscious
suggestiveness in oral communication, body language or procedure by police can lead eyewitnesses to
make mistaken identifications, or to express confidence in their identification that their actual memories
do not wan-ant); Gary L. Wells, Scientific Study of Witness Memory: Implications for Public and Legal
Policy, 1 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L 726, 727 (1995) ("Research and theory on lineups, memory
interview techniques, and eyewitness confidence, for example, make use of cognitive processes other
than memory, such as social influence .... Police somehow feel perfectly free to fire poorly constructed
questions at eyewitnesses... and generally not use any theory of a proper memory interview.").
134. See Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 52, at 1541-42 ("Efforts to rehabilitate
apparently biased prospective jurors by asking them whether they could follow the judge's instructions
and abide by their oaths as jurors cannot be trusted."); Jaffe, supra note 57, at 36-37 (showing how
nebulous answers readily hide truly ADP sentiments). A proscription of "rehabilitation" for both
prosecution and defense is the ideal condition of voir dire because it is the condition most conducive to
the empanelment of genuinely qualified capital jurors. Realistically, however, this is not likely to become
universal practice in the near future. Therefore, our position that trial counsel must be adept at
rehabilitation, see supra text accompanying note 121 and infra note 191 and accompanying text, is
consistent with our conclusion here.
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"speak the truth" than is group questioning.' " As the Supreme Court
observed in one case, "[n]o doubt each juror was sincere when he said
that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological
impact [of] requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its
father."' 36 Scholarship corroborates this conclusion:
135. See United States v. Deasker, 537 F.2d 40, 56 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that iuid id!il
examination ofjurors "is the most effective manner by which to discover latent prejudices on the part of
a particularjuror. Indeed, under certain circumstances it may be the only mans of assuing a defendant
his right to an impartialjury."); Commonwealth v. Hooper, 679 N.-2d 602, 604 (Mass. App. C. 19971
(finding "that an individual voir dire is more conducive to juror candor" in matters of mcial prejudice
than are general questions to the venire); Bush, supra note 131, at 19 ('Courts hava zacc Pd the
proposition that individual voir dire (out of the presence of other jurors) promoes candor."?. New
Jersey's Supreme Court "insist[s] on an individualized voirdire for capital cases '[blecause of tke rn.e
of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing.' Because juries have so much more
discretion, there is a greater need to screen out those jurors who cannot be impartial." State v. Loffin. 6S0
A.2d 677, 698 (NJ. 1996) (quotingTurner v. Muray,476 U.S. 28.35 (1986) (citation omitedit.
136. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (unanimous decision); see also United States v.
Rezaq, 134 F3d 1121, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Wald, J.) (concluding that "the collective roir dire is not
ordinarily the instrument of choice for disceming the impartiality ofjurors"). In on. capital case. Juds e
Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted-
"The voir dire in this case ... was conducted in the presence of all the pro-Tctise
jurors. The inhibiting effect of a large audience and the tendency for potential jurors to
incorporate other's [sic] voir dire testimony into their own mada a careful and probing %oir
dire all the more important Moreover the danger that potential jurors would be prejudiced by
comments made by other potential jurors during voir dire made questioning a more delic.te
exercise"
Berryhill v. Zant, 858 F.2d 633, 641 (11th Cir. 1988) (Clark, J, specially concurring) (quoting
unpublished order at 18, No. 85-258-R (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1986)); see also Co!eman Y. Kemp, 778 F.2d
1487, 1542-43 (l1th Cir. 1985) (observing that "in light of the overwhelming evidLene that the
community had prejudged both guilt and sentence,... the conclusory protestations of impartialit) in th
voir dire are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudicc"); United States v. Hawkins, 658 F-d
279,283 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190. 196-93 (5th Cir. 1973): United Stzacs.
Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 1975) ("In a case vith serious racial and religious urLrton s and
where the court is facing a ten-day trial, good sense would seem to suggest that the court "dapt t,
practice of individual examination so that defense counsel may be in a position to make inJi,.idualizcd
judgments with respect to peremptory challenges:'); United States v. Dellinger, 472 2d 340. 37617th
Cir. 1972) ("'We feel bound to concede that such a single question posed to the panel en blm, with an
absence of response, achieves little or nothing by way of identifying, wighing or remr'ing prejuice
from prior publicity."' (quoting Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (lst Cir. 196)in;
Silverthomev. United States, 400 F.2d 627,639-40 &n.15 (9thCir. 1968); REPoRTOFT1tECoW.EE
ON THE OPERATION OFTHE FEDERALJUDICIAL CONFERENCE, JD. COF. U.S. 59 (Oct. 29-30. 19701
(stating that "trial judges in their broad discretion over voir dire proceedings. may occasionally find it
appropriate to examine jurors individually, out of the presence of other jurors, when questions rele ant to
the case may call for personal or potentially embarrassing response&" (emphasis ad d , qa,:cd in
United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299, 1304 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Moseley. 445 S.F.2d 906.
914 (N.C. 1994) (declining to require that trial courts always use sequestered. individual woir dire, but
admitting that a lack ofjuror candor-whether based on a juror's reluctance to be open before a group.
or learning to formulate answers to be excused from the panel, or learning to respond so as "to conze-al
preconceived determinations regarding guilt or innocence"--is a "danger... present in c'ery caz in
which sequestration and individual voirdire is not allowed"); Commonwealth v. Johnson. 269 A.2d 752.
757 (Pa. 1970); Bush, supra note 131, at 19 ("Courts have accepted the proposition that irdividual wir
dire promotes candor."); cf Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 137 )3d Cir. 19371
(observing "that 'an individualized examination is the most effective manner by which to disco'.r lI=t
prejudices on the part of a particular juror."' (quoting United States v. Damker, 537 F2d 40.56 (3d Cir.
1976))); Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (addressing inquiry ino jur)
prejudice during the course of trial: "It is too much to expect of human nature that a juror wuld
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Researchers have accepted that individual questioning of jurors
promotes candor where as the collective questioning is ineffective at
obtaining juror candor....
... Social science research supports individually questioning jurors
outside the presence of other jurors as the most effective method to
obtain candid answers to all questions, especially the more difficult
questions. Researchers noted that "studies about conformity have
demonstrated that to avoid calling attention to themselves, panel
members subjected to collective questioning do not willingly volunteer
information about themselves or reveal opinions that deviate from the
other panel members."
3 7
It is also clear that some venire members in group voir dire will observe
the questioning of jurors before their turn comes, and attempt to
structure their answers either to get on the jury or to keep off it.' Thus,
because candid responses are necessary to determine who is qualified to
serve and who is not, individual sequestered voir dire is necessary. In
some instances, it also proves more efficient, in that it prevents jurors
from being tainted by references to the external sources of information
or otherwise prejudicial remarks.
Third, judges should avoid phrasing that implies that the task is to
sentence the defendant to death.'39 At every point in the qualification
process, judges should speak in the alternative about the penalties that
volunteer, in open court, before his fellow jurors, that he would be influenced in his verdict by a
newspaper story of the trial").
137. Debora A. Cancado, Note, The Inadequacy of the Massachusetts Voir Dire, 5 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & ApP. ADvoc. 81, 96-97 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (quoting NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, chs. 1I-l, 68 (1976)); see also Broeder, supra note 1, at 503, 511, 528
(discussing juror admissions in one study that they had lied or failed to speak out during group voir dire
because of nervousness); David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self Disclosure in Voir Dire: A Social
Science Analysis, 56 IND. LJ. 245, 259-60 (1981) (noting researchers' findings of increased anxiety in
people called forjury service, and pressures undermining juror candor and encouraging conformity).
138. See Payne & Cohoe, supra note 117, at § 21 ("Group voir dire increases the probability that
some prospective jurors will contrive to be seated or excused."); Bush, supra note 131, at 14, 20
(pointing out study results showing the learning that takes place during group voir dire; specifically, how
jurors noticed that other jurors who admitted to, i.e., being crime victims or having police relatives were
excused, and thus withheld such information when their tum came in voir dire).
139. For the dangers latent in the "processing" effect, see Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301
(Cal. 1980), superseded by statute, CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 223 (west Supp. 2001). In Hovey, the court
noted:
In a typical death-qualifying voir dire, the judge and the attorneys repeatedly instruct the
jurors about the steps leading to the penalty trial and question each prospective juror,
oftentimes at considerable length, concerning his or her attitudes about capital punishment.
These repeated displays of concem about the death penalty before any evidence of guilt has
been presented may prompt the jurors to infer that the court and counsel assume the penalty
trial will occur.
Id. at 1348; see also supra note 69 (reviewing literature on the prevalence of jurors' reaching sentencing
decisions even before the sentencing phase begins).
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might be imposed. Thus, rather than describing the bifurcation of the
trial as first deciding whether the defendant is guilty and then deciding
whether to impose the death penalty, a judge should refer to deciding
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, and if she is found guilty,
then deciding whether to sentence him to death or to life imprisonment.
Or, to take another example, the judge should not ask a juror whether
she can follow the law and impose the death penalty, but whether she
can follow the law and impose the appropriate sentence, either death or
life imprisonment as the case may be. If this speech pattern at first seems
unnatural or a cumbersome alternative to a convenient shorthand, a
judge could consider whether she would prefer to refer, at all times, only
to "the innocence/life option," for example, describing bifurcation as
first "determining innocence" and then "determining whether a life
sentence is appropriate."
Fourth, judges should minimize signals that the prosecutor is the
secondary authority figure. The judge can introduce the defendant, all of
the defense and prosecution lawyers, and other trial participants in the
courtroom, instead of letting the prosecutor do so. The judge can also
alternate the order of voir dire, sometimes allowing defense counsel to
go first, and sometimes the prosecutor. Indeed, given the numerous other
signals that the prosecutor is the one with authority-she puts her case
on first, she calls police officers to testify, she refers to herself as "We
the people of the State of New York"--it would be more truly equitable
to allow defense counsel always to go first.'" Moreover, it would be
useful for the judge to say from the outset something to this effect:
If you reach a guilty verdict, then the law will be satisfied by either a
sentence of life imprisonment or of death. The Prosecutor would ask
for a sentence of death, and the defense counsel would ask for a
sentence of life imprisonment, but they would be the only ones asking
you for either verdict. I am here, at all stages, only to determine the
admissibility of evidence and instruct you on the law. The law and I
will be completely satisfied with either a not-guilty or guilty verdict-
and, should we come to a sentencing phase, with either a life sentence
or a death sentence, whichever is your decision.
Fifth, and finally, the CJP data suggest that judges should begin-
in voir dire-the difficult task of educating the jury as to the nature of
mitigation and the burdens that fall to each party, since it is clear that
jurors do not adequately absorb these concepts when their instruction in
140. Allowing the defense to sit nearer the jury would, for similar reascns anslieraze 5no of th:
prejudicial influences that are especially pernicious in capital trials.
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the concepts is delayed until the sentencing phase. Rules concerning a
jury's application of aggravating and mitigating factors to sentencing
vary from state to state on such matters as whether factors must be
enumerated by statute, and each side's burden of proof.4 Despite these
actual variations, jurors show uniform beliefs about burdens of proof and
sentencing factors that appear impervious to the actual similarities or
differences in the law between jurisdictions.' In particular, pervasive
burden-shifting views among these experienced jurors, who have been
instructed in the law by a judge, strongly indicate that common, popular-
culture notions about the law and about trials outweigh and overwhelm
jurors' efforts to grasp and act on complex, subtle and sometimes
counterintuitive rules of law concerning burdens of proof and the need
for unanimity in reaching certain decisions. Jurors' erroneous, burden-
shifting notions appear to constitute a body of received wisdom that
resists closing arguments by lawyers and instructions from judges, and
the complexity of burden allocation in capital trials may exacerbate these
predispositions. When jurors are baffled or overwhelmed, they are far
more likely to resort to their pretrial impressions for guidance.
Capital jurors must make not one decision, but a sequence of
decisions,' 3 each with different combinations of unanimity requirements
and burdens of proof. Given this sequence, it is not surprising that
significant numbers of jurors believe the defendant has the burden of
proving mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt; after all, the prosecution
has to prove the existence of an aggravating factor by that standard.
Similarly, it is not surprising that former jurors wrongly believe that
mitigation must be unanimously agreed upon, or that a statutory
mitigating factor must be present to justify a life sentence, because jurors
make the understandable layperson's mistake of assuming that
superficially similar categories must be subject to the same standards
and applied in the same way. In applying the law to mitigation,
therefore, jurors simply (albeit erroneously) transfer to that task the
requirements that they must be unanimous in agreeing on the presence of
an aggravating factor, and that at least one statutory aggravator must be
present to make a case death eligible.
Thus, voir dire offers the judge an opportunity to begin educating
jurors about the complexity of capital sentencing law. She need not
lecture each juror on all of these details, but she can add to the open-
141. See Blume, MODERN MACHINERY, supra note 8 (manuscript at 13-17 & tbls.3-4).
142. See id. (manuscript at 13-15 & tbl.3).
143. See Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1263, 1272 (2001) (noting that jurisdictions typically
"give[] capital juries, at the penalty phase, discrete and sequential functions").
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ended questions about a juror's attitudes a summary of the legal burdens
on the prosecution and the defense, followed by a question whether the
juror will follow instructions on those burdens, and concluding with an
assurance that if the jury does not understand the law, they should ask
her for further instruction. The reason to start this process at voir dire is
not only that it allows repetition, which is crucial to comprehension, but
also that, as the CJP data reveal, most jurors have made up their minds
about the sentence prior to the close of the guilt phase.
B. Expanding Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire
1. Permitting Attorney Participation
At least in capital cases, courts must permit attorneys to voir dire
potential jurors. Judges can and should cover some of the most basic
preliminary elements of voir dire, such as previous knowledge of the
case, acquaintance with the parties, statutory qualifications, general
background information, and so on.'" Moreover, as noted in the previous
section, judges increase the reliability of the qualification process when
they pose open-ended introductory questions concerning death penalty
attitudes. A judge, however, is not an advocate, and lacks the knowledge
and incentive that are crucial to a lawyer's effectiveness in voir dire.' 5 In
order to assure "'adequate voir dire [absent which] the trial judge's
responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able
144. Judicial questioning on these matters also saves time for the attorney, time that she can use
during her questioning "to frame the issues of the case and listen to the jurors." Part 1: Veir Dire-
Choosing the Best Jurors and Establishing the Thene of the Case, 13 Crim. Prac. Rep. 316. 316 (1999)
[hereinafter Part 1].
145. See Frasher, supra note 92, at 1348-49. The article elaborates:
Empirical studies indicate that potential jurors answer attorey-a-sked questions more
candidly than those questions asked by the judge. Judicial questioning is less effectie sinze
judges are unable to probe potential jurors' biases thoroughly because they lack both th--
advocates' knowledge about the case and the advocates' incentives to obtain useful
information about the jurors' ability to make a fair decision. Judges routinely ask qu -tions
such as, "Can you be fair and impartial?" for wvhich the "correct" answer is obvious to a
veniremember. Those veniremembers who want to be on the jury respond "corrncdy." and
judges generally believe their unrevealing answers. haen trial judges use their discretion to
restrict questioning for the sake of efficiency, they may, in turn. force attom-)s to use
peremptory challenges based on stereotTes.
Id (footnotes omitted); see also JEFuERYT. FREDERICK, MAgRIG VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELETIO;:
GAINING AN EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING A JURY 50 (1995) ("Be.ause of th- high status
generally accorded to the judge, voir dire examination conducted by the jud. e is less likely to yield
candid and honest answers by jurors than law'yer- orjudgellawyer-conducted woir dire."); Barbara Aen
Babcock, Voir Dire: Preser'ing "Its Wonderfd Power". 27 STAN. L RMv. 545. 548-49 (1975)
(contending that a well-prepared lawyer is best situated to que-stion jurors and identify bias); Go!d, supra
note 93, at 170 (arguing that attorney detection of bias is more effective bcuse advoa es are better
qualified to expose juror bias in their specific cases).
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impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence
cannot be fulfilled,"" 6 questioning by advocates is necessary. '
Indeed, the language of Morgan clearly anticipates attorney-
conducted voir dire: "'As with any other trial situation where an
adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it is the
adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through
questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality. It is then the trial
judge's duty to determine whether the challenge is proper.""" A number
of jurisdictions recognize the peculiar need for attorney participation in
capital case voir dire, but even if the jurisdiction does not so provide by
statute, as a constitutional matter, trial courts should grant the defendant
the opportunity to have counsel conduct voir dire.
2. Employing Questionnaires
For the judge who is concerned that permitting attorney
participation will expand voir dire to intolerable lengths, preliminary
questionnaires promise both time-savings and increased candor.'49
"[J]urors are willing to admit unfavorable opinions in written
responses to questionnaires that they would hesitate to reveal out loud in
the courtroom.... [E]xamples [include] negative opinions of racial or
ethnic groups, and prejudicial attitudes about attorneys and prejudicial
attitudes about attorneys and the court system."''  Courts should
146. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,729-30 (1992) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
147. See Dees, supra note 1, at 14. As Dees argues:
Skillfully conducted voir dire is the most important element in a fair trial. Most judges seem
not to believe this, or they believe it the wrong way. They think that any twelve people with
no direct interest or obvious prejudice will make a fine jury; and they think that is all any
defendant can demand. Such judges would not hire a legal secretary or law clerk that way,
yet they apparently think a perfunctory selection process is good enough for a jury that will
decide the fate of a person's property, or perhaps his life.
lI
148. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,423 (1985)).
149. Courts across the country have acknowledged the value of questionnaires, and have frequently
endorsed their use. See e.g., United States v. Layton, 632 F. Supp. 176, 177 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Even if not
customary practice in a jurisdiction, courts should invite and encourage counsel to submit a motion
requesting the administration of ajuror questionnaire. A hearing on the matter may illuminate the issues
to the court's satisfaction, but it is likely that such a hearing will not be so extraordinarily revealing as to
be an essential preliminary to the court's agreement to the administration of the questionnaire. See Part 1,
supra note 144, at 316.
150. Part I, supra note 144, at 316. In a capital trial in Greenville, South Carolina (State v. Harris
(S.C. County Ct. 2000) (Nos. 2000-GS-3119, 2000-GS-23-3120, 2000-GS-23-3121)), one venire
member had, in a response to a questionnaire item, written that one of his nicknames is "Racist."
Interview with Jeffrey P. Bloom, Attorney at Law (Columbia S.C.) (Richland County, S.C. Public
Defender, 1992-1999), in Greenville, S.C. (Oct. 19, 2000). Then, when the juror was personally in court,
on the witness stand, and swom in, defense counsel asked him why people who know him call him that.
See id. He professed ignorance. (A defense attorney reported that he heard one of the State Law
Enforcement Division ("SLED") agents, sitting near the defense table and guarding the defendant, scoff,
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encourage prior agreement between defense counsel and the prosecutor
on the questions in the questionnaire to expedite the process; courts may
also find that attorneys will be willing "to prepare, copy and disseminate
the questionnaire[] so that its administration does not inconvenience
the court."'5 '
The virtue of having attorneys assume extensive responsibility for
questionnaires lies primarily in the complexity of creating effective
instruments for uncovering sources of bias. Experienced capital
defenders do not use standard-form questionnaires; each capital
defendant, each capital case and each local jury pool are so distinct that
they require highly individualized surveys." In most instances, defense
attorneys will be willing to take on the task of composing the
questionnaire, in part because it is to their advantage to integrate that
task into their crucial work of deciding on a theme of the case, and
developing and staying focused on that theme through all stages of the
trial.'
53
3. Expanding the Scope of Permissible Inquiry
Voir dire is "'conducted under the supervision of the court, and a
great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion."""s Yet, this
discretion is bounded by the constitutional basis of the right to adequate
voir dire. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, one
composed of "jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the
sotto voce, "Liar"). One of the defense attorneys later speculated that, as the juror was filling out thz
form, it had not really daured on him that he would actually be on the stand, undzr oath, in op n court,
facing questions on what he v.Tote. See id.
151. Part 1 supra note 144, at 316.
152. Cf Payne & Cohoe, supra note 117, § 84 (asserting that even in non-capital trials itlril
counsel must adapt his questions to the individual case, the community in which the case is to be tried.
and the nature of the prospective panel being questioned").
153. Indeed, experienced defense counsel w ill almost certainly hire a jury expert to asst in
preparing the questionnaire. Knowledgeable attorneys kmow that there is simply no 'rub-itu!t for an
expert's analysis and guidance in preparing a useful survey (not to mention in acdzuatcly prpring
counsel for jury selection, and in assisting counsel in evaluating individual jurors throug-hout o.ir dire
and jury selection). See id. § 12 (A consulting psychologist can bc of great assis tanze during jury
selection and voir dire, whether as a resource tool before trial to help develop the jnry selection tra.-egy,
or during voir dire to assist in directing the questioning of proective jurors."); ABA GunDELIE, s.,pra
note 2, Guideline 11.7.2 cmt. ('Since capital cases demand an even more expansive voir dire than
general criminal cases, counsel should consider obtaining the assistance of... a specialist" ifNMeo:e
omitted)).
154. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976) (quoting Connors v. United States, 15S U.S.
408,413 (1895)); see also State v. Patterson (Patterson lf. 482 S..2d 760, 765 IS.C. 1997); State v.
Davis, 422 S.E.2d 133, 140 (S.C. 1992), overmdcd on other grounds, Brightman v. State, 520 S.E2d
614,616 n.5 (S.C. 1999); State v. Smart, 299 S.E.2d 686,691 (1982). overrded on o&zrgr0:.n-s, State
v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315,324-28 & n.5 (S.C. 1991) (Toal, J., separate concurring opinion joined by
majority) (abolishing doctrine of infavorem vitae).
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facts."'55 In the words of Lord Coke, a juror must "'be indifferent as he
stands unsworn,"' 56 and a juror whose evaluation of the evidence is
likely to be jaundiced by prejudgment cannot be deemed to meet this
requirement.'51 Because impartiality goes to "the fundamental integrity
of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury,"' 58
whenever it is threatened, "the probability of deleterious effects on
fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny."'' 9 "'[A] suitable
inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any
bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair
determination by him of the issues to be tried. ' ''IW
The question, of course, is when a "suitable inquiry" is required.
The mere possibility of partiality does not entitle the defendant to
question jurors; for example, the Supreme Court has held that a
defendant is not entitled to question jurors concerning possible prejudice
against people with beards,16' even if the defendant has a beard and such
a bias is conceivable. Rather, the Due Process Clause mandates "an
assessment of whether under all of the circumstances presented there [is]
a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about
[the source of prejudice]," the jurors will not be impartial.'62
This standard is applied with special scrutiny in capital cases. Thus
in Turner v. Murray,63 with respect to the risk of racial bias, the
Supreme Court gave two reasons for presuming that in a capital case,
unlike other cases, voir dire with respect to potential bias is necessary.
First, it noted an increased likelihood that bias will affect a capital case:
"[Given] the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to
operate but remain undetected."'64 Equally important, however, was the
increased seriousness of a biased determination, according to the Court,
"[t]he risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is
155. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985); see also Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946) (noting that "trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-
section of the community").
156. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (quoting CoKE ON Lrr=ON 155b (19th
ed. 1832)).
157. See id. at 154-56.
158. Tumerv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466,472 (1965).
159. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,504 (1976).
160. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408,413 (1895)).
161. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524,527-28 (1973).
162. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,596 (1976).
163. 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (plurality opinion).
164. Id. at 35.
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especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death
sentence.""
, -  
o
Thus, because unexplored racial attitudes of potential jurors in
capital cases hold a significant risk of undermining the jury's
indifferently conscientious application of the law and because deviation
from indifferent application has such harsh consequences in capital
cases, the defendant has a right to voir dire the venire members about the
details of their attitudes toward race. If potential jurors' attitudes toward
the death penalty itself similarly risk undermining the jury's
indifferently conscientious application of the law, then the defendant
must be permitted to voir dire the venire members about the details of
their attitudes toward the death penalty. As Chief Justice Hughes
expressed it,
If in fact... [venire members] were found to be impartial, no harm
would be done in permitting the question, but if any one of them was
shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his rendering a
fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to
. 166Sit.
With respect to the subject of inquiry, the logic of Turner compels
the conclusion that death penalty attitudes warrant questioning: "[Given]
the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing
hearing," biased attitudes about the "mandatory" nature of the death
penalty or the role of mitigating evidence clearly present a "unique
opportunity" for juror prejudice' 7 to operate covertly, but to devastating
165. Id.
166. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 303, 314 (1931) (Hughes, C11. Te Chief Justice's
further remarks are also apt here:
[Tihe government [argues] that it would be detrimental to the administration of the law in the
courts of the United States to allow questions to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We
think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that prsons entertaining a
disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit
the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer , y could be devised to bring the prccs es
ofjustice into disrepute.
Id. at 314-15.
167. Turner,476 U.S. at35. Prejudgment withn ,speettodeath penalty "ssues-sueh asw %therthe,
punishment is mandatory or the significance of mitigation-legitimately correlates to ra ial prejudice as
a necessary object of inquiry under the reasoning of Turner. Just as "inquiry as to racial prejudice di'vcs
its constitutional stature from the firmly established precedent of Aldridge and the numerous state cases
upon which it relied, and from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those vho clopted thz
Fourteenth Amendment," Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524,528 (1973). the constitutional necessity
for inquiry into death penalty attitudes among the venire must flow from the Suprene Court's firmly
established precedents of Tuilaepa, Sumner, Roberts, and Weildson, that the death pnalty can nzecr be
mandatory, from the Court's fim-ly established precedents of Morgan, Penry and W,/ings thal jurors
must be able and willing to give effect to mitigating evidence, and to the eythaustively analyzed bas - for
those decisions in the Eighth Amendment.
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effect.'68 The "especial[] serious[ness] in light of the complete finality of
the death sentence" also weighs toward questioning about juror attitudes
toward the death penalty. 69 Indeed, Morgan holds as much, clarifying
that, in a capital case, questioning of potential capital jurors as to
whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty on the facts
of the particular case, or could consider and give effect to the relevant
mitigating factors in the case, is not only suitable, but constitutionally
required, if a capital defendant is to receive a voir dire adequate to
protect her right to a trial before an impartial tribunal.' 70
The only open question is how much and what kind of voir dire on
death penalty attitudes is warranted. It is here that the CJP data are
compelling; when voir dire is cursory, it fails its purpose, and results in
the seating of biased, constitutionally unqualified jurors. If voir dire in
capital cases is to succeed in its constitutionally required mission of
swearing in an impartial jury able to follow the law, far more detailed-
and probative-inquiry is required. We now turn to what sort of
questions are needed and whether there are other legal barriers to asking
those questions.
The starting point is recognition of the ineffectiveness of theoretical
inquiries as to whether a venire member has biases against the death
penalty as a general proposition. Instead, the defendant must be allowed
to question potential jurors as to whether they will consider and give
effect to the mitigating factors relevant in the particular case. 7' The
types of questions that judges frequently bar, labeling them "staking
out," "sneak preview," or "loaded questioning,"'72 are not in fact
168. In addition to those jurors who are prejudiced in favor of the death penalty, some jurors favor a
life sentence in the particular case in which they serve, but vote for a death sentence out of the mistaken
belief that they have no opinion under the law. See Josh White & Brooke A. Masters, Va. Court
Overturns Death Sentence: Inmate Was Convicted of Slaying Teen in '99, WASH. PosT, April 21, 2001,
at BI (quoting the jury forewoman of a Virginia capital case, that "I was very confused, and I felt that I
had to sentence him to death .... I was looking for a reason to be able to let him live in prison rather
than be executed, and I felt I didn't have that opinion under the law."). Although most scholarly and
professional attention to this manifestation of juror error tends to focus on addressing the problem by
reforming jury instructions, it is at least as important to begin correcting such misapprehension at the
beginning of the trial, during voir dire.
169. Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
170. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,733-35 (1992).
171. See, e.g., McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1329 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming that defendant
could properly question jurors to obtain helpful information about their attitudes toward drug and alcohol
intoxication as a mitigating circumstance).
172. See United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 740-42 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (no error to
disallow question on how juror would weigh testimony of different witnesses) (overruling United States
v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990)); State v. Southerland, 447 S.E.2d 862, 866 (S.C. 1994) ("An
inquiry as to the weight a juror would give one kind of witness over another invades the province of the
jury."); State v. Longworth, 438 S.E.2d 219,221 (S.C. 1993) (finding "no error in disallowing questions
regarding the weight a juror would give one witness over another"); State v. Davis, 422 S,E.2d 133, 139
(S.C. 1992) (finding no error in barring inquiry into whether juror would give more weight to testimony
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attempts to lock jurors into a particular course of action, but inquiries
into whether jurors are actually prepared to act as the Supreme Court has
said they must: to consider giving weight to mitigating factors. Defense
counsel must first address the ability of potential jurors to meaningfully
consider any mitigating evidence-to establish that they could truly
consider and evaluate it. Follow-up inquiry regarding specifc mitigating
factors is, however, also necessary.
Done properly, inquiry concerning specific mitigating factors does
not seek a relative assessment of the weight a juror would give certain
substantive evidence. Rather, the appropriate inquiry seeks to ascertain a
juror's ability to weigh or give effect to mitigating evidence. This entails
no unsanctioned "sneak preview" of how jurors will weigh specific
mitigating or aggravating evidence at trial. As distinguished from an
improper "preview," such questioning is a necessary and
constitutionally-sanctioned inquiry into whether a juror is already
biased. This is because such case-specific penalty bias remains a basis
for disqualification even if the juror, in the hypothetical capital case,
could consider a penalty less than death."' Nor is the scope of inquiry
into specific mitigating factors an improper attempt to "stake out" jurors.
A defendant making such inquiries is merely protecting her
constitutional right to a fair trial by assuring that all jurors before whom
she is tried are capable of weighing all relevant mitigating factors.
During voir dire, therefore, defense counsel should be allowed, at the
very least, to inquire into each individual juror's ability to consider and
give effect to the relevant statutory mitigating factors.""
of police officer than to that of civilian witness), oremded on other groninds, Brightman v. State, 520
S.E.2d 614,616 & n.5 (S.C. 1999); State v. Adams, 306 S.E.2d 203, 212 (S.C. 1933) (holding improp.r
the subject matter of question regarding whether juror would give more ;eight to testimony of polic,
officer than to that of civilian witness), overmled on other grounds, State v. Torrene, 406 S.E.2d 315,
324-28 & n.5 (S.C. 1991) (Toal, J., separate concurring opinion joined by majorityp (JaolM ing doctrinxe
of infa'orem vitae).
173. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, when a death penalty statute requires that a juror
consider all the aggravating factors and mitigating factors supported by the evidence, ajuror "%,,ha would
invariably impose the death penalty upon conviction cannot be said to have reached this d-cisivn baszd
on all the evidence" and thus is a lawless juror, "for such a juror will not give mitigating evidmnc te
consideration that the statute contemplates." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 738. As Justice Sealia observe d. "it is
impossible in principle to distinguish between a juror who does not believe that any factor can be
mitigating from one who believes that a particular factor-e.g., "exttrme mental or emotional
disturbance['--is not mitigating:' l at 744 n.3 (Scalia J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
174. Evidence is mitigating if it leads to an inference that "might serve *as a basis for a s-ntcnze
less than death."' Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1. 5 (1986) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)). Under Lockett, relevant mitigating evidence includes, per sz, anything 'hich bear
upon the record, background and history of the defendant or the cin'umstances of the crime, and lessens
the defendant's moral culpability. Compare Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586. 604 ( 1978) with S.kpe:-r, 476
U.S. at 7 n.2 (evidence of defendant's "personal hygiene pratces" would be irrelevant to a szn=zing
determination), and State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619,627 (S.C. 1934) (stating that "how often [dzfenjants]
will take a shower" is irrelevant to the sentencing determination). All relevant mitigating evildem must
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This conclusion is all the more compelling in view of case law
indicating that when the shoe was on the other foot-when the
prosecutor wants to ask analogous questions-courts are often willing to
allow such inquiry. 75 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied
an analysis we think is correct. Grayson v. State... upheld a trial court's
decision to let a prosecutor ask if jurors "believe solely because an
individual has been drinking alcoholic beverages that they are less
responsible for their criminal acts than otherwise"; if "the fact that a
defendant had no prior criminal record would keep any of you from
voting for the death penalty"; if "the fact that [defendant] had an
accomplice would affect any of your ability to vote for the death
penalty"; and if "the fact that the defendant was 19 at the time that a
crime was committed[] would... affect any of your abilities to return a
death penalty.' 77 The court found none of the questions improper
because they did not "eliminate consideration of, or force the jury not to
find, any mitigating factors": 71
A party may not solicit a promise to return a particular verdict. In
asking [these] question[s], the prosecutor was not asking for a
commitment or promise from the prospective jurors to vote for the
death penalty. He was merely attempting to determine if any of the
potential jurors were of a mind-set that would affect their verdict as
tending to show bias or interest. The parties have a right, within the
sound discretion of the trial court, to do this.
179
be considered by the jury. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729; Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Accordingly, defense counsel
must be allowed to pursue on voir dire the ability of each potential juror to consider and give effect to
such evidence.
Moreover, defense counsel must be allowed to inquire as to any bias that would impair a
juror's ability to follow the law with respect to mitigating evidence presented or elicited at either the
guilt/innocence or sentencing phase of the trial. Indeed, the question that the Supreme Court insisted
should have been asked in Morgan, "[i]f you found [the defendant] guilty, would you automatically vote
to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are?," Morgan, 504 U.S. at 723, refers to the "facts"
to be elicited at trial. By requiring the proposed question in Morgan, the Supreme Court nandated
inquiry into whether jurors harbor any preconceptions that would prevent them from considering the
"facts" elicited at trial because they have "predetermined the terminating issue of [the] trial, that being
whether to impose the death penalty." IL at 736.
175. A recent article surveyed an extensive number of cases in which appellate courts upheld trial
court rulings giving prosecutors wide latitude in capital-case voir dire, even when the same courts
disallowed similar defense inquiries and challenges for-cause. See Holdridge, supra note 51, at 290-99 &
nn.56-58.
176. 675 So. 2d516 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
177. Id. at 522.
178. Id.
179. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting ExParte Ford, 515 So. 2d 48, 52 (Ala,
1987)).
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This, we think, was rightly decided and reasoned,' and ought to be
applied with an even hand to defense inquiries.''
C. Assuring Competent Voir Dire
In the end, of course, the willingness of a court to permit probing
voir dire means nothing if defense counsel does not know how to
conduct it. In the long run, legislatures must reckon with the enormous
complexity of capital trial representation,' " which demands that defense
counsel be trained,'" experienced,'4 prepared,ss and adequately
180. That is not to say that any juror's affirmative ansvars to most of these questions hould have
been cause for excusing that juror. A juror's "belief that intoxication diminishes culpability," and
acknowledgment that "the existence of an accomplice" or "the defendant's age being 19" woul affect
her ability to vote for a death sentence, are indications of legally nccessaOy sensitivity to mitigation. re
of constitutional disqualification. Of course, the prosecutor may use such qu stions to search for l-z to
disqualifying sentiments, or to ascertain jurors to target for peremptory strikes. On the other han,! to th
extent that an inquiry into whether a defendant's lack of a prior criminal record would -kecp" a juror
from voting for a death sentence is a request for an absolute commitment on the juror's ra2poze to
prospective evidence, that question is "staking out" under current case law, and should not have bean
allowed unless modified to a noncommittal form-e.g., asking about"willingn to corsid:r."
181. In another death penalty case, the prosecutor appeared to attempt, during voir dire, to
introduce case-specific testimony concerning aggravated murder, and the Sixth Circuit held that thers
was no error in allowing the prosecutor to ask venire members vwhether they w ould be:
bothered by the method of death and how a person dies,... wez are talking about a knife ....
about a blade that long being stuck in a man and him bleeding through his liver and b!.edlng
internally. Do you have a stomach for that, to listen to the coroner testify about the rrethod of
death?
Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 531 (6th Cir. 2000). cen. denied, 531 U.S. 1082 (2001). When the
prosecutor followed up by asking whether the jurors could "set that aside, however ga:r ecir the
details... :'the court stated.
This demonstrates that the prosecutor, far from trying to inflame pro-pective jurors agairAt
Petitioner, was attempting to determine whether the prospective jurors could remain fair and
objective regardless of the emotional impact that the facts of this brutal crime might have on
them. This type of questioning is not improper....
ld. (footnote omitted). We would question whether this was the correct interpretation of the proscutor's
motives, but putting questions of disingenuousness aside for the moment, would othernwiS thini th-
result correct
There are other examples of courts finding reason to allow prosecutors substantial Ieway in
asking hypothetically-posed case-specific questions in voir dire. See Pcop!e v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160,
1187-88 (Cal. 1992) (concluding "that the prosecutor's questions [w, hethr the defendant's relative youth
and fact that there was not more than one victim would prevent the jurors from imposing a d.-a
sentence] were entirely proper because they were directly relevant to whether ajuror vould be subject to
a challenge for cause"); People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 588-89 (Cal. 1992) (declining to find crror in
trial court's permitting prosecutor to ask case-spaecific questions on voir dire. reasoning "that 'a question
fairly phrased and legitimately directed at obtaining knowledge for the intelligent exercise of premp*:ory
challenges may not be excluded merely because of its additional tendency to indoctrinate or edCtrete the.
jury" (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (Cal. 19811))
182. See ABA GUtDELtNES, supra note 2, Guideline 1.1 cmL (concluding that"death p=enlty ca:z
have become so specialized that defense counsel has duties and functions definably different from thase
of counsel in ordinary civil cases").
183. See id. Guidelines 5.1(1)(A)(vi), 5.1(IX)B)(.i)(d), 9.1.
184. See id. Guidelines 5.1(I)(A)(fi)-(v), 5.1()XB)tii)(a)-(c).
185. See id. Guidelines 11.3, 11.4.1-2, 11.5.1, 11.6.1-4, 11.7.1-3, 11.8.3 (disc u sing wide-ranging
preparation required with respect to ascertaining the prosecution's sentencing intentions, coa uct of
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funded.la At the very least, if statute does not so provide, courts should
require counsel to have no less than five years of felony trial
experience,'8 and to have completed formal training programs in capital
defense"s Hands-on training is absolutely indispensable; nowhere is the
adage "practice makes perfect" more true. 9 Voir dire alone presents a
daunting array of challenges, and courts should urge the establishment of
CLE training programs focusing on this critical aspect of capital defense.
pretrial investigation and client consultation, decisions on pretrial motions, plea negotiations, general trial
strategy, including relation of guilt/innocence-phase strategy to sentencing-phase strategy, voir dire and
jury selection, and specific sentencing-phase strategy).
186. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guidelines 8.1, 9.1, 10.1 (calling for appropriate funding
of supporting services, attorney training, and attorney compensation); Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, supra note 83, at 2147 (arguing for states to adopt a comprehensive package of reforms in order
to ensure adequate representation and funding for the defense in capital cases).
187. See ABA GUIDELNES, supra note 2, Guideline 5.1(I)(A)(ii) (urging that lead trial counsel
have "at least five years litigation experience in the field of criminal defense"); see also Norman
Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its
Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REv. 495, 501-02 (1996). This portion of the article discussed
Indiana's adoption of legislation in the early 1990s making state funds available to local jurisdictions that
satisfy the Indiana Public Defender Commission's guidelines for appointment of qualified counsel in
capital cases, and the Commission's incorporation within its guidelines of a state supreme court rule. See
id. at 500-12. With respect to indigent defendants:
(1) The rule requires that two "qualified" attorneys be appointed in all death penalty
proceedings.
(2) The rule establishes qualifications for lead and co-counsel. Lead counsel must "be an
experienced and active trial practitioner with at least five (5) years of criminal litigation
experience." Also, lead counsel must have had prior experience as lead or co-counsel in at
least five felony jury trials [that] were tried to completion and have had prior experience in at
least one case in which the death penalty was sought. (The Commission had recommended
that lead trial counsel have had at least nine prior felony jury trials.)
(3) Co-counsel must "be an experienced and active trial practitioner with at least three (3)
years of criminal litigation experience." In addition, co-counsel must have had experience as
lead or co-counsel in at least three felony jury trials that were tried to completion. (The
Commission had recommended that two of the prior felony jury trials have been trials in
which the charge was murder or a class A felony under Indiana law.)
(4) Additionally, no lawyer is qualified to serve as lead or co-counsel unless they "have
completed within two (2) years prior to appointment at least twelve (12) hours of training in
the defense of capital cases in a course approved by the Indiana Public Defender
Commission."
Id at 501-02 (footnotes omitted) (discussing IND. R. CRIM. P. 24 as proposed and adopted); see also
Carol Marbin Miller, State High Court Raises Barfor Death Row, Capital Case Lawyers, MIAMI DAILY
Bus. REv., Nov. 5, 1999, available at httpd./www.floridabiz.comlexpefmldisplay.cfrnid=2266> (last
visited Apr. 4, 2001) (discussing Florida Supreme Court's promulgation of rules on minimum standards
for capital defenders; lead defenders must have five or more years criminal-case trial experience,
including nine or more jury trials in serious or complex matters and two or more capital cases; trial
judges encouraged though not required to appoint two defenders in each case); Maurice Possley & Ken
Armstrong, Revamp Urged in Handling of Capital Cases: Study Seeks Higher Attorney Standards, C1.
TRm., Nov. 4, 1999, at NI (reporting reforms in a dozen or more states that "have established minimum
standards for defense attorneys in capital cases," which usually "require that at least two attorneys be
appointed in capital cases and that they have a certain number of years of experience in trying criminal
matters").
188. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note2, Guidelines 5.1()(A)(vi) to (I)(B)(ii)(d), 9.1.
189. See Thomas F. Liotti & Ann H. Cole, Quick Voir Dire: Making the Most of 15 Minutes, N.Y.
ST. B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 39, 39 ("As with most aspects of trial work, only practice can help an attorney
turn voir dire into an art form.").
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Courts can substantially enhance the just administration of the law
if they are attentive to the enormous range and depth of the challenges
facing an attorney in the competent conduct of voir dire in a capital trial.
Competent voir dire requires strategies for ferreting out hidden biases,"
techniques for rehabilitating jurors who express reluctance to impose the
death penalty, 9' analysis of interpersonal and group dynamics in
formulating the defense's jury-selection strategy,'" an agenda for
confronting the dangerous mistaken notions about criminal law that
many ordinary citizens bring with them to the venire,' educating jurors
in their obligation to resist peer pressure when they are unpersuaded,"
and communicating the defense's theme of the case."- Judges have a
uniquely authoritative position from which to inform and persuade the
bar at large, and legislators, that the complexity of capital defense is
such that few, if any, attorneys will be prepared to handle those tasks
without extensive training, including moot court exercises.
It makes it far easier for judges to fulfill their roles as neutral
arbiters of the law when the advocates appearing before them-
prosecutors and defense counsel-are comparably capable, and possess
190. See ABA GUIDELINEs, supra note 2, Guideline 11.7.2 cmt. (trning of the "in%-Lib!a but
lethal currents of prejudice" that, almost invariably, many venire members cleave to).
191. See id. Guidelines 1.1 cmt., 11.7.2(B) ("Counsel should bz familiar vith techniqu:s for
rehabilitating potential jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make th-m
possibly excludable"); Nietzel & Dillehay, supra note 96. at 7 n.8 ("It is generally believed that a !killftl
defense attorney can, in the course of individual sequestered voir dire, rehabilitate or '-save' rr
venirepersons whom the prosecution would challenge bacause of their anti-deth-penalty sentins.".
192. See GINGER, supra note 131, § 11.27 (illustrating the importance of jurors' int~aperrnal
relations in juries' deliberations); DONALD E. VINSON & DAVID S. DxvIS. JURy PEmRsLSi0:;:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES & TRIAL TECHNIQUES 188-59 (3d ed. 1996) ('[Trial lavwj"z must
evaluate the individual's potential interaction vith other membars of the jury panel .... [A] pe --n may
possess attributes [that] would ordinarily disqualify him as a desirable candidate but trertlre2e.s be
acceptable because of potential social group influences; and, of course, the opposite may be the case.").
193. See JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 13S-40 119371
(concluding, on the basis of "the disparity between existing legal principles and tha opinions of h)me
and potential jurors about these principles" (for example, the opinion that a criminal defindant '1'ould
prove her innocence is held by well over a third of the population), that voir dire is an indispensablz
opportunity to address such misconceptions, and to discem % iech jurors are so entrendhed in th-m that
they must be excused for cause).
194. See Jaffe, supra note 57, at 36 ("'[W]e should convey that the decision conce ning th- death
penalty is not a group decision, but an individual moral decision; and decisions and thou ght prozes-es
must be respected at all times during the deliberation.").
195. See JEFTREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION: G.%INV.G A-N
EDGE IN QUESIONNG AND SELECTING A JURY 50 (1995) ("Crucial for success at trial is identif-ing a
persuasive theme of the case.... Developing questions that reveal the potential jurors' receptivity to thz
party's theme is important"); Stephen B. Bright, Dereloping Themes in Closing Argument and
Elsewhere: Lessons From Capital Cases, 27 LmG. 40, 41 (2000) t"Voir dire providzs not only an
important opportunity to identify biases that may interfere vith a juror's ability to consider counsel's
theory of the case, but a chance to persuade the jury."); Call, supra note 86. at 4S-49 ("Jury se!Zction is
not the most important task during voir dire. During voir dire the attomey reeds to decide vhich
veniremen to challenge, indoctrinate the potential jurors with respect to key points of the trial steox and
make a good first impression. The second and third tasks are the most important."
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comparable resources. From the courts' point of view, then, ideally the
attorneys representing indigent defendants will work in a well-staffed,
properly funded statewide office for indigent defense, either one devoted
116to, or with a section that has established expertise in, capital defense.
The bench will provide a great service if it can impress on the bar and on
legislators the complexity and necessity of abiding by the constitutional
requirements of providing each defendant a fair trial by an impartial
jury, and the great advantages of meeting those requirements through a
guarantee of truly capable counsel at trial, as compared to having to
defend the errors of incapable counsel on direct appeal and collateral
proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
"Voir dire is short and then you die." That bleak (and pithy)
description was our working title for this article. As we finished our
work, we became less, well, dire. There are many intractable legal
problems, and certainly the administration of the death penalty has its
share. Life qualification, however, is not such a problem. Relatively
minor changes in voir dire practices would go a long way toward
assuring that the jurors who decide who lives and who dies are legally
qualified to do so. Life will always be short, but voir dire can and should
be longer-longer than a mere cursory glance at the jurors our system
charges with life and death decisions.
196. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, Guideline 3.1(a).
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